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This Mine is Mine! 
How Minerals Fuel Conflicts in Africa†
By Nicolas Berman, Mathieu Couttenier, Dominic Rohner,  
and Mathias Thoenig*
We combine georeferenced data on mining extraction of 14 minerals 
with information on conflict events at spatial resolution of  0.5 o  × 0.5 o 
for all of Africa between 1997 and 2010. Exploiting exogenous vari-
ations in world prices, we find a positive impact of mining on conflict 
at the local level. Quantitatively, our estimates suggest that the his-
torical rise in mineral prices (commodity super-cycle) might explain 
up to one-fourth of the average level of violence across African coun-
tries over the period. We then document how a fighting group’s con-
trol of a mining area contributes to escalation from local to global 
violence. Finally, we analyze the impact of corporate practices and 
transparency initiatives in the mining industry. (JEL C23, D74, L70, 
O13, Q34)
Natural riches such as valuable minerals have often been blamed for fueling 
armed fighting. A case that recently made headlines is the heavy fighting that broke 
out between the Rizeigat and Bani Hussein, two Arab tribes, for territorial control 
of the Jebel Amer gold mine in Darfur region. The conflict has killed more than 
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800 people and displaced some 150,000 others since January 2013.1 Armed groups 
extract revenues from mines without necessarily directly managing them, and extor-
tion and bribery have been widely documented in mineral-abundant conflict areas. 
An example is the financial and logistical support provided by the mining company 
AngloGold Ashanti in 2003–2004 to the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI), 
a rebel group operating in the gold-rich district of Ituri in eastern DRC.2
The present paper investigates the impact of mining on conflict by using geolo-
calized data on conflict events and mining extraction of 14 minerals for all African 
countries over the 1997–2010 period. Our results show that mining activity increases 
the incidence of conflicts at the local level and then spreads violence across terri-
tory and time by enhancing the financial capacities of fighting groups. Our empiri-
cal analysis is based on the combination of an original dataset, Raw Material Data 
(RMD), documenting the location and the types of mines and minerals, with the 
Armed Conflict Location Events Data (ACLED), containing information on the 
location and type of conflict events and the involved actors. The units of analysis 
are cells of 0.5  × 0.5 degree latitude and longitude (approximately 55 km  × 55 km 
at the equator) covering all of Africa. The use of georeferenced information enables 
causal identification. Including country  × year fixed effects and cell fixed effects, 
we exploit in most of our econometric specifications the within-mining area panel 
variations in violence due to changes in the world price of the main mineral extracted 
in the area.
In the first part of our analysis, we estimate the overall extent of mining-induced 
violence at the local level. We find a positive effect of mining activity on conflict 
probability: a spike of mineral prices increases conflict risk in cells producing these 
commodities. These results are robust to a variety of consistency checks. We also 
find that countries with less corrupt institutions and with lower religious fraction-
alization/polarization are less affected by mining-induced violence; however, we 
detect little effect of political institutions (e.g., democracy, rule of law, government 
effectiveness). Similarly we find that minerals associated with higher rents are par-
ticularly conflict-prone. We then perform several quantification exercises to gauge 
the magnitude of the effect. A one-standard deviation increase in the price of min-
erals translates into an increase in probability of violence in mining areas from 
the benchmark 16.9 percent to a counterfactual 22.5 percent. When aggregated at 
the country level, the effect remains sizable. Indeed we quantify the effect of the 
 historical rise in mineral prices between 1997 and 2010, which according to most 
1 Fighters from the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) have operated their own illicit gold mine in Hashaba to the 
east of Jebel Amer to finance their fighting. Other prominent examples of rebels sustaining their fighting efforts with 
the cash from running mines include rebel groups operating in Sierra Leone and Liberia, such as the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) that financed weaponry with “blood diamonds” (Campbell 2002), or Angola’s rebels from 
União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) that financed their armed struggle with diamond 
money (Dietrich 2000). See “Special Report: The Darfur Conflict’s Deadly Gold Rush,” Reuters, October 8, 2013. 
Another example is the Marikana Mine Massacre, where in 2012 several dozen people were shot in a wildcat strike 
at a platinum mine owned by Lonmin in the Marikana area, close to Rustenburg, South Africa. See “South African 
Mine Owner Amplats Fires 12,000 Workers,” BBC, October 5, 2012. 
2 “D.R. Congo: Gold Fuels Massive Human Rights Atrocities,” Human Rights Watch brief, June 5, 2005. For 
the complete report, see Human Rights Watch (2005, p. 65). AngloGold Ashanti have been accused of having estab-
lished a relationship with the FNI “who had effective control over the Mongbwalu gold mining area, to facilitate 
their gold exploration activities.” This relationship involved payments of bribes as well as logistical support, in 
particular through the transportation of FNI leaders. 
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scholars was mainly due to the sharp increase in the demand for minerals by emerg-
ing market countries such as China and India (Humphreys 2010; Carter, Rausser, 
and Smith 2011). Our estimates suggest that the contribution of this so-called com-
modities super-cycle to the average violence observed across African countries over 
the period lies between 14 percent and 24 percent.
In the second part of the paper we take a more global view and investigate the 
diffusion over space and time of mining-induced violence, a question of central 
importance for understanding how local conflicts escalate into regional or national 
wars. Looking at the nature of violent events, we find that mineral price spikes fuel 
both low-level violence (riots, protests) and organized violence (battles). The ratio-
nales behind each type of violence being different, we focus on battles involving 
African rebel groups over the period, and provide evidence that mines spread con-
flict across space and time by making rebellions financially feasible. More precisely, 
we first show that spikes in the price of minerals extracted in the ethnic homeland of 
a rebel group tend to diffuse its fighting operations spatially outside its homeland. 
As a second and alternative strategy, we make use of the information contained in 
the ACLED data on the winners and losers of particular battle events. We show 
that the appropriation of a mining area by a rebel group increases the probability 
that this group perpetrates violence elsewhere in the country in the following years. 
Quantitatively, our estimates suggest that every conquest of a mining area triples the 
subsequent fighting activity of a group.
Having documented how mining allows rebel groups to expand their fighting 
activities, we show in the last part of the paper that the characteristics and behavior 
of extracting companies also are key. Mining companies have an ambivalent role. 
On the one hand, they may be willing to secure areas where they plan to operate; on 
the other hand, they may contribute to the diffusion of violence by financing/brib-
ing rebel groups. We provide suggestive evidence in line with the second channel. 
Our results show that mining-induced violence is associated mainly with foreign 
ownership. Nevertheless, among foreign companies, the ones that operate in the 
least corrupt countries, and the ones that comply with corporate social responsibility 
practices are associated with less violence. Finally, we evaluate the impact of the 
recent transparency/traceability initiatives that have been promoted by international 
agencies, and find some evidence that these top-down policies have been able to 
reduce the conflict risk.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we study resource 
abundance and conflict (i) for all major minerals; (ii) using data at a high spatial 
resolution; (iii) covering all Africa; and (iv) going beyond pooled panel regressions. 
Second, we provide direct, large-scale evidence of how capturing a mining area 
affects the diffusion of conflict over space and time. This yields findings that are in 
line with the view that resource rents can fuel diffusion of fighting by making it fea-
sible to sustain rebellion. Third, to the best of our knowledge we are the first ones to 
document how mining company characteristics and practices (e.g., size, location of 
headquarters, compliance to Corporate Social Responsibility) can contain or boost 
mining-induced violence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the existing literature and 
the conceptual framework that underpins our empirical analysis. Section II presents 
the data. Section III displays the empirical analysis related to the local impact of 
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mining activity on violence and how it varies with country and mineral character-
istics, as well as with the types of violent events. In Section IV we study the diffu-
sion over space and time of mining-induced violence perpetrated by rebel groups. 
Section V studies the role of mining companies and of transparency initiatives, and 
Section VI concludes.
I. Existing Evidence and Conceptual Framework
In the last ten years the empirical literature has shown an increasing interest in 
linking natural resource abundance to civil conflict and other forms of violence.3 
Most existing papers have estimated pooled cross-country regressions finding that 
civil war onset and incidence correlate positively with natural resources, generally 
focusing on oil, diamonds, or narcotics.4 The main shortcoming of this first genera-
tion of papers is that resource-rich and resource-poor countries typically differ also 
in various geographic, demographic, political, and economic dimensions, and the 
existence of unobserved heterogeneity complicates the causal interpretation of such 
cross-country correlations.
A more recent literature tries to address this issue through the use of panel data 
and the inclusion of country fixed effects, focusing on variations in prices or resource 
discoveries as an identification device. This has led to contradictory results. While 
Lei and Michaels (2014) find a positive effect of oil discoveries on conflict, Cotet 
and Tsui (2013) find that oil discoveries no longer show an effect on conflict when 
controlling for country fixed effects. Commodity price shocks also have an unclear 
effect on conflict, and are found in particular to be unrelated to conflict onsets (Bazzi 
and Blattman 2014). One of the reasons for these contradictory results could be that 
using the country-year level as the unit of observation is just too aggregate, since in 
many countries conflicts are concentrated in certain regions (such as the Niger delta 
in Nigeria or the Kurdish part of Turkey). Given this within-country heterogeneity, 
aggregating information into a country-year panel may lead to noisy estimates and 
hence attenuation bias. Recently, some papers have used disaggregated data on natu-
ral resources and conflict for one particular country, such as Dube and Vargas (2013) 
on oil in Colombia; Aragón and Rud (2013) on a gold mine in Peru; Maystadt et al. 
(2014) on minerals in the DRC; and Sanchez de la Sierra (2015) on coltan and gold 
in Eastern Congo. However, so far there does not exist a study of the nexus between 
natural resources and conflict based on a panel of disaggregated cells covering all 
minerals and a whole continent (Africa), as in the current paper. This feature yields 
a big gain in terms of external validity.
From a conceptual perspective, a rich theoretical literature has identified several 
major channels through which natural resources magnify the risk of conflict: a  survey 
relevant for our analysis being provided by Bazzi and Blattman (2014). First,  natural 
3 Natural resources have also been found to empirically matter for homicides (Couttenier, Grosjean, and Sangnier 
forthcoming), for organized crime (Buonanno et al. 2015), for interstate wars (Caselli, Morelli, and Rohner 2015), 
and for mass killings of civilians (Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner 2015). 
4 See De Soysa (2002), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Ross (2004, 2006), Fearon (2005), and Humphreys (2005) in 
the case of oil; Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore (2005), Humphreys (2005), Ross, (2006), and Lujala (2010) focusing 
on diamonds; and Angrist and Kugler (2008) and Lujala (2009) on narcotics. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) provide 
evidence more generally related to primary commodities. This cross-country literature has also found that lootable 
resources (e.g., alluvial gemstones, narcotics) prolong conflicts (Fearon 2004; Ross 2004, 2006; Lujala 2010). 
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resources improve rebellion feasibility, i.e., looting and extortion relax financing con-
straints and make it easier to set up and sustain a rebel movement. Second, the pres-
ence of natural resources increases the prize to be seized through the capture of the 
territory or the state, a practice referred to as greed or rent-seeking. Third, weak state 
capacity and extractive institutions may be a further consequence of resource wealth. 
Rentier states can rely on resource rents and do not develop enough state capacity 
and good institutions, making them less effective in counterinsurgency and eventually 
more unstable. Fourth, given that natural resource production is capital-intensive, a 
resource price spike will boost capital-intensive production and shrink labor-intensive 
sectors, which frees up cheap labor for rebellion. Fifth, natural resources can exacer-
bate grievances, due to frustrations from environmental degradation or banned access 
to lucrative mining jobs. Sixth, mining booms could affect migration patterns and lead 
to changes in the size and composition of the local population in mining areas with 
respect to ethnicity, age, and gender.5 Finally, there is a channel working in the oppo-
site direction: higher local incomes in mining areas may increase the opportunity cost 
of rebellion, which in turns decreases the likelihood of conflict.
The existing empirical literature typically has been unable to distinguish between 
these different theoretical mechanisms.6 In the first part of the paper, we document a 
positive causal impact of mineral prices’ variations on conflicts, which is consistent 
with all the mechanisms mentioned above (except the last one). However, in the sec-
ond part of the paper we focus specifically on the feasibility channel. In particular, we 
find that territorial control of mining areas leads rebel groups to spread their fighting 
elsewhere in successive periods. We also find that foreign mining companies oper-
ating in corrupt environments trigger more conflict, which is a piece of suggestive 
evidence on the participation of these companies in financing rebel groups. Overall, 
we see these results as supporting the existence of the feasibility channel. But in no 
way does this finding preclude that other mechanisms concurrently are at work.
II. Data
A. Data Description
The structure of the dataset is a full grid of Africa divided in subnational units of 
0.5  × 0.5 degrees latitude and longitude (which means around 55  × 55 kilometers at 
the equator). We use this level of aggregation rather than administrative boundaries 
to ensure that our unit of observation is not endogenous to conflict events.7 Our unit 
of observation therefore is a cell-year in Sections III and V; that is, we study how 
 mineral resources affect the probability that a conflict takes place in a given cell 
5 For feasibility, see Fearon (2004), Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009), Nunn and Qian (2014), and Dube 
and Naidu (2015); for greed, see Reuveny and Maxwell (2001), Grossman and Mendoza (2003), Hodler (2006), 
and Caselli and Coleman (2013); for state capacity, see Fearon (2005), Besley and Persson (2011), and Bell and 
Wolford (2015); for capital-intensiveness, see Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2011) and Dube and Vargas (2013); for migra-
tion, see Le Billon (2001), Ross (2004), and Humphreys (2005). 
6 A notable exception is Humphreys (2005), who uses among others the distinction between production and 
reserves to distinguish between different channels, estimating pooled cross-country regressions, as well as Morelli 
and Rohner (2015) and Dube and Vargas (2013) documenting the role of secession and capital-intensiveness, 
respectively. 
7 See, e.g., Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) or Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) for papers using simi-
lar grid-cell level data combined with the same conflict data. 
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during a given year. In this section we provide information about the main datasets 
and variables used in the paper. More details appear in online Appendix Section A.
Conflict Data.—We use the Armed Conflict Location and Event dataset (Raleigh, 
Linke, and Dowd 2014), which contains information on the geolocation of conflict 
events in all African countries. We focus on the 1997–2010 period which overlaps 
with our mines data. We have information about the date (the precise day most of the 
time), longitude, and latitude of conflict events within each country. These events 
are obtained from various sources, including press accounts from regional and local 
news, humanitarian agencies, or research publications. A first unique feature of 
ACLED is that it records all political violence, including violence against civilians 
and rioting and protesting within and outside a civil conflict, without specifying a 
battle-related deaths threshold. Another is that it contains information on the type 
of events, their outcome, and the characteristics of the actors on both sides of the 
conflicts. We know in particular if the event was a battle, the names of the groups 
involved, and who won the battle.8 We shall make use of this information when 
testing for the channels of transmission.9
The latitude and longitude associated with each event define a geographical loca-
tion. ACLED contains information on the precision of the georeferencing of the 
events. The geoprecision is at least the municipality level in more than 95 percent 
of the cases, and is even finer (village) for more than 80 percent of the observations. 
We keep only those events which are geolocalized with the finer precision level for 
our analysis, and drop duplicated events.10
The data are aggregated by year and 0.5  × 0.5 degree-cell. We construct a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if at least one conflict occurred in the cell during the year, 
which we interpret as cell-specific conflict incidence. This is our main dependent 
variable throughout the paper. Alternatively, we compute a variable containing the 
number of events observed in the cell during the year, which we label conflict inten-
sity. We also show that our results are robust to modeling cell-specific conflict onset 
and ending separately.
While the geocoding of the events is cross-checked in the ACLED dataset, it is 
not immune to potential biases and measurement errors. We cannot rule out the 
possibility that the reporting of conflicts is biased toward certain types of countries, 
regions, or events, as some regions might in particular have better media coverage. 
An event dataset such as ACLED cannot, by definition, be fully exhaustive. Our 
empirical  methodology makes it unlikely however that this characteristic affects our 
8 Eight different types of events are included in ACLED: battle with no changes in territory; battle with territory 
gains for rebels; battle with territory gains for the government; establishment of a headquarters; nonviolent activity 
by rebels; rioting; violence against civilians; and nonviolent acquisition of territory. Actors are classified according 
to the following typology: government or mutinous force; rebel force; political militia; ethnic militia; rioters; pro-
testers; civilians; outside/external force (e.g., UN). 
9 The presence of this detailed information and the more exhaustive character of the ACLED are the main 
reason why we chose to use this dataset, rather than the UCDP-GED dataset. The latter records only deadly events 
pertaining to conflicts reaching at least 25 battle-related deaths per year, and does not include information on battle 
event outcomes. We nevertheless also show and discuss the results obtained using the UCDP-GED dataset in  online 
Appendix Section E. 
10 This has no impact when considering conflict incidence, our main variable of interest, but reduces noise when 
looking at the number of events as we do in a robustness exercise. 
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results, as structural differences in media coverage or more generally in the report-
ing of events is captured by cell and country-year fixed effects.11
Mines Data.—To each cell-year, we merge information on mines from Raw 
Material Data (RMD, IntierraRMG). The data contain information on the location 
of mines around the world since 1980.12 For each year, we know whether a mine 
is active, the year production started, the specific minerals produced, and the total 
production for each of them. We use these data to identify active mining areas, and 
the type of minerals they produce. The dataset also includes additional information 
about the ownership structure and characteristics of the mines, as well as some data 
about extraction methods. We return to these variables in Sections IIIE and V in 
which we study the role of minerals’ and mining companies’ characteristics.
For each cell  k , we define  M kt , a dummy variable which equals 1 if a least one 
active mine is recorded in the cell during year  t . We identify 25 minerals in our sam-
ple of African countries. In the rest of the analysis we focus on the cells producing 
one or several of the 14 minerals for which we have price data.13 We define as the 
main mineral produced in the cell the mineral with the highest production over the 
entire period, evaluated at 1997 prices.14 Among the 237 mining cells for which 
a main mineral is identified, 70 percent produce a single mineral, and the main 
mineral produced represents on average 96 percent of total production value. In the 
robustness section, we show a number of robustness checks related to the definition 
of the main mineral; in particular we restrict our sample to single-mineral cells or 
consider all the minerals produced in a price index instead of the main mineral only.
The RMD dataset collects information mostly for large-scale mines, usually 
operated by multinationals or the country’s government. Hence, small-scale mines, 
and those that are illegally operated, are not included in our sample. While these 
measurement errors could lead to some attenuation bias in our estimates, we believe 
that this concern is limited, given our empirical strategy. First, our baseline spec-
ifications include time-invariant versions of  M kt and identify the effect of mining 
through variations in world mineral prices within cells; in other words, measure-
ment errors are unlikely to attenuate our estimates given the inclusion of cell fixed 
effects. Second, our unit of analysis being an area (i.e., a 0.5  × 0.5 degree-cell) 
where mining takes place, we interpret our variable  M kt as a proxy for the extraction 
area of a given mineral rather than as coding for a specific RMD-referenced mine. 
If minerals are spatially clustered, these mining areas include all mines, including 
11 We also show that our results are obtained across events of different types (battles, riots, violence against 
civilians). Similarly, when considering jointly ACLED and UCDP-GED events, our coefficient of interest is similar 
for the two datasets, despite the fact that the UCDP-GED dataset is less exhaustive and records only large, deadly 
events which are arguably less likely to be affected by reporting bias. 
12 More information is available at http://www.snl.com/Sectors/metalsmining/Default.aspx. Other recent 
research using the RMD data includes Kotsadam and Tolonen (2016), who study gender and local labor market 
effects of mining, as well as Knutsen et al. (2017), who assess the impact of mining on local corruption. 
13 These minerals are: Bauxite (aluminum), Coal, Copper, Diamond, Gold, Iron, Lead, Nickel, Platinum (and 
Palladium/PGMs, i.e., Platinum Group Metals), Phosphate, Silver, Tantalum (Coltan), Tin, and Zinc. These min-
erals are present in 92 percent of mining cells over our period of study. We do not consider the following minerals: 
Antimony, Chromite, Cobalt, Lithium, Manganese, Niobium, Rhodium, Tungsten, Uranium, Vanadium, Zirconium. 
14 For some cells, minerals for which we have prices coexist with minerals for which we do not, complicating 
the identification of the main mineral. In most cases, however, we can identify the main mineral produced by using 
additional information contained in the RMD data about the name of the mines. More details about the procedure 
are provided in online Appendix Section A. 
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small ones. Note that we estimate a number of robustness tests to ensure that our 
results are not sensitive to changes in the definition of a mining area. In particular, 
we include the surrounding cells (first and second degrees) or use 1  × 1 degree units 
instead of 0.5  × 0.5. As shown later, results are consistent across specifications.
Other Data.—Information on the world prices of the minerals is retrieved from 
the World Bank Commodities prices dataset. Real prices are measured in constant 
2005 US$. We also add diamond prices from Rapaport. Diamond prices are prob-
lematic as these vary significantly according to the quality and type of diamonds 
produced. There is a large heterogeneity in diamond quality across mines, and the 
price series for different qualities can move in opposite directions. As the RMD 
dataset contains no information on diamond quality, we exclude diamonds from our 
baseline sample in order to limit measurement errors. We show however that our 
results are robust to the inclusion of this mineral. Similarly we add data on tantalum 
(coltan) price from the US Geological Survey. Unfortunately this series contains US 
unit values rather than a world price. To be consistent, we exclude tantalum from 
our baseline estimations and keep only the minerals for which world price data are 
available. Again, we show that adding coltan leaves our results largely unchanged. 
Finally, we add a number of cell-specific variables (distances, climate, ethnic home-
land), country-specific data (institutions, social and ethnic cleavages, transparency 
initiatives), and mineral-specific information (extraction cost or method).
B. Descriptive Statistics
Our final sample covers 52 countries and 14 minerals (see Appendix Section A 
for a visual representation of the geolocalization of both conflict events and mines). 
Only 4 countries display no conflict events over the entire period and there are 
20 countries with no active mine recorded. The main minerals present in the dataset 
are gold (one-third of mining cells), diamond, copper, and coal (around 10–15 per-
cent each). Note that, except in the case of South Africa, the countries contained in 
our sample typically are small producers of the minerals from a world perspective: 
the average market share of a country-mineral is around 6.5 percent (the median 
at 2.9 percent), and drops to 4.5 percent when we exclude South Africa (and the 
median to 1.6 percent).
Table 1 displays some descriptive statistics. Our sample consists of slightly more 
than 10,000 cells over 14 years. Several features are worth mentioning. First, the 
unconditional probability of observing at least one conflict in a given cell and a 
given year is low, around 6 percent. In the majority of cells no event occurs over the 
entire period. The probability of observing an active mine in a given cell is also low 
at 2 percent, but it increases to 9 percent (respectively, 17 percent) when we con-
sider the neighboring cells (respectively, the first- and second-degree neighboring 
cells). Second, mines tend to be spatially clustered: conditional on observing at least 
one mine in a given cell, the average number of mines is 2.57. Finally, the conflict 
probability is much higher in cells with active mines, around 14 percent. Of course, 
this could be due to many unobserved cell characteristics, an issue we shall deal 
with in our estimations. In online Appendix Section B, we document correlations 
between the presence of mining areas and the likelihood of violent events at the cell 
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level. We find that the presence of active mines is positively correlated with conflict 
incidence, both across and within cells.
III. Exogenous Changes in the Value of Mines: Local Impact
We turn now to our empirical analysis. First, we discuss our identification strat-
egy and report the baseline results. Second, we provide a series of alternative spec-
ifications assessing the robustness of the results. Then we focus on heterogeneous 
effects. Finally, we perform various quantification exercises.
A. Methodological Issues
Assessing the causal impact of mining on violence involves a range of method-
ological challenges. The most obvious relates to the reverse causation from local 
violence to mine opening/closing. The direction of this bias is negative most likely, 
i.e., conflict incidence might impact negatively the likelihood of a mine being active. 
This intuition should work against our finding of a significant positive correlation 
between mining activity and conflict. However, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that conflicts affect the value of a mine in a nontrivial way, for instance if the state 
uses part of the mine production to fight insurgency.15
15 Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) actually find evidence that conflicts increase the value of extractive firms. 
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics: Cell Level
Observations Mean Standard deviation Median
Pr(Conflict  > 0 )
 all cells 144,690 0.06 0.23 0
 if mines  > 0 2,798 0.14 0.35 0
 if mines  = 0 141,892 0.05 0.22 0
 battles 144,690 0.03 0.17 0
 viol. against. civ. 144,690 0.03 0.17 0
 riots and protests 144,690 0.02 0.12 0
Number of conflicts
 all cells 144,690 0.25 3.41 0
 if  > 0 7,980 4.61 13.79 2
Pr(Mine  > 0 )
 only cell 144,594 0.02 0.14 0
 incl. 1st surrounding cells 144,690 0.09 0.29 0
 incl. 1st and 2nd surrounding cells 144,687 0.17 0.38 0
Number of mines
 all cells 144,594 0.05 0.60 0
 if  > 0 2,702 2.57 3.55 1
Pr(number of mines  > 2 )
 all cells 144,690 0.01 0.09 0
 if mine  > 0 2,798 0.40 0.49 0
Source: Authors’ computations from ACLED and RMD datasets.
1573Berman et al.: How minerals Fuel ConFliCts in aFriCaVol. 107 no. 6
In order to address causality, we focus on exogenous variations in the economic 
value of mines. The idea is that more valuable mines increase local rent-seeking and, 
consequently, the likelihood of violence.16 To abstract from local determinants of 
violence and guarantee exogeneity, we exploit the variations in the world prices of 
minerals, and estimate a specification of the following form:
(1)  conflict kt =  α 1  M kt +  α 2 ln  p kt W +  α 3 ( M kt × ln  p kt W ) + F E k + F E it +  ε kt ,
where  (k, t, i) denote respectively cell, time, and country,  F E k are cell fixed effects, 
and  F E it is an additional battery of fixed effects that can vary at different levels 
depending on the specification (e.g., year, country  × year). Note that border cells 
are assigned to the country that represents the largest share of their area. The depen-
dent variable,  conflic t kt , corresponds to the observation of violent events at the 
cell-year level where violence is measured in terms of incidence, i.e., a binary vari-
able coding for nonzero events in the ACLED dataset on civil conflicts. Alternative 
measures of violence are considered in our sensitivity analysis in Section IIIC. The 
main explanatory variable,  M kt is a binary variable coding for the presence of at least 
one active mine at the cell-year level. The variable  p kt 
W corresponds to the world 
price in year  t of the main mineral produced by the mines present in cell  k , i.e., 
the one with the highest total production (evaluated at 1997 prices) over the entire 
1997–2010 period. For cells where no active mine ever produces over the period 
we set  p kt W to zero; by contrast, it is nonzero for cells with a mine that is inactive 
only temporarily. Our sensitivity analysis investigates alternative coding rule for  M kt 
and  p kt W (Section IIIC).
In equation (1) we focus primarily on the estimates of  α 3 , the coefficient of 
the interaction term between the price and the dummy for mining activity. This 
coefficient captures the impact on local violence of an exogenous increase in the 
world price of a given mineral, in cells where mining extraction of this mineral 
takes place.17 As we include fixed effects at the country-year level, our identification 
strategy relies on the exogeneity of the interaction term,  M kt × ln  p kt W , with respect to 
the local determinants of conflict. We discuss this identification assumption below.
Exogeneity of Prices.—This seems a reasonable assumption for the world price 
of minerals,  p kt W , as mentioned earlier. Still, some mines may be large enough to 
affect world prices. If conflict occurs in their locations, prices could be affected. 
Although our sample contains only few countries with potentially large power in 
the mineral market, we test whether our results are robust to excluding from the 
sample all cells located in countries belonging to the top ten world producers of a 
specific mineral (see Section H in the online Appendix). Another possibility is that 
time-varying omitted variables could codetermine world prices and local violence in 
mining areas. The use of country  × year fixed effects in our baseline  specifications 
16 See Dube and Vargas (2013) for a similar methodology applied to coffee and oil production in Colombia. 
17 An alternative approach would be to focus on price growth over time (i.e., difference in log-prices). Section 
M in the online Appendix contains a discussion of these two alternative specifications. We perform unit root tests 
on the price series and conclude that these are stationary (once purged from their common time trends), which sup-
ports the use of price levels in our estimations. Section M also contains several alternative specifications, including 
dynamic OLS estimations which separate the long-term from the short-term impact of mineral price variations. 
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alleviates most of this problem, but in our sensitivity analysis we consider placebo 
exercises to ensure that our results are not driven by comovements of the residual 
unobserved heterogeneity and world mineral prices.
Endogenous Mining Activity.—As discussed above, potential reverse causation 
from conflicts to mines opening and closing is an important concern. As a conse-
quence, our coefficient of interest,  α 3 , could be partly driven by conflict-induced 
shifts in the binary variable  M kt . To account for this issue, we first restrict the esti-
mate of equation (1) to the subsample of cells for which mining activity always 
takes place during the period (i.e.,  V( M kt ) = 0 for a given  k ). Given that  M kt = 0 
or  M kt = 1 for all years, this variable is now absorbed by the cell fixed effects and the 
covariates  ln  p kt W and  ( M k × ln  p kt W ) become identical. Accordingly, we include only 
the interaction term and the specification takes the following simpler expression:
(2)  conflic t kt =  α 3 ( M k × ln  p kt W ) + F E k + F E it +  ε kt . 
This specification ensures that our coefficient of interest,  α 3 , is identified within 
cells through the changes in world commodity prices conditional on having perma-
nently active mining activity (i.e.,  M kt = 1 for all  t ), and not through the potentially 
endogenous opening/closing of mines.
An alternative way to get rid of endogenous mining activity is to define as 
mining areas cells where a mine has ever been recorded as active over the 1997–
2010 period.18 Under this coding rule the mining activity dummy becomes 
 time-invariant,  M k ∈ {0, 1} , such that the econometric specification is given by 
equation (2) and the coefficient of the interaction term  α 3 keeps on being identified 
through changes in world mineral prices only. The advantage of this approach is 
that it can be estimated on the full sample of cells and not on a selected subsample, 
as is the case with the estimation based on cells without mines opening/closing. Its 
disadvantage is that a cell can be considered a mining area even when no mining 
may have taken place in a given year.
Estimation Issues.—Due to the inclusion of several dimensions of fixed effects, 
we estimate equations (1) and (2) using a Linear Probability Model in our base-
line specifications. Nonlinear estimators such as conditional logit or Poisson pseu-
do-maximum-likelihood estimators are implemented as robustness checks. Note also 
that with more than 900 country  × year fixed effects in most specifications, estimat-
ing the large battery of fixed effects is very demanding from a data perspective. In this 
respect, keeping in the sample not only cells with mines but also the large number 
of cells with no mines ( M kt = 0 for all  t ) conveys information which is decisive 
for estimating these dummies. This is why we favor, in our baseline, specifications 
including the set of cells without mines, coding as zero the world price for these cells. 
Alternatively, we implement a neighbor-pair fixed effects methodology in the spirit 
of Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson (2012) and Buonanno et. al (2015): 
equation (2) is estimated on the subsample of mining cells and their  immediate 
18 In the same vein we consider alternative coding rules in Section IIIC. In particular, we code  M k = 1 if the 
cell had an active mine in the presample period (i.e., in the five years prior to 1997). 
1575Berman et al.: How minerals Fuel ConFliCts in aFriCaVol. 107 no. 6
 neighboring cells without mines. We define a neighborhood fixed effect that is spe-
cific to each (mine + neighbors) group. The price of the main mineral produced 
in the mining cell is also assigned to its neighbors. By contrast, the mining dummy 
can differ as it is set to zero in neighboring cells with no mine. Identification hence 
relies on relative variations in conflict incidence in the mining cell with respect to its 
neighboring cells when the world price of the main mineral changes. This approach 
is similar in spirit to a matching estimator. With a sample size reduction by a factor 
10, this is a demanding specification. Its main benefit in our context is that it avoids 
coding to zero the log of mineral prices in cells with no mines.
Spatial Correlation.—Given the high spatial resolution of the data, it is import-
ant to take spatial correlation into account since both conflict and mines are clus-
tered in space. Henceforth, in all specifications standard errors are estimated with 
a spatial HAC correction allowing for both cross-sectional spatial correlation and 
 location-specific serial correlation, applying the method developed by Conley (1999) 
and Hsiang, Meng, and Cane (2011). Our treatment is quite demanding, as we 
impose no constraint on the temporal decay for the Newey-West/Bartlett kernel that 
weights serial correlation across time periods. The horizon at which serial correlation 
is assumed to vanish can be infinite (i.e., 100,000 years). In the spatial dimension we 
retain a radius of 500 km for the spatial kernel: close to the median internal distance 
in our sample of African countries according to the CEPII geodist dataset.19
B. Baseline Results
Table 2 reports the baseline results for various sample compositions and defi-
nitions of the variables. The dependent variable is conflict incidence. We see that 
in all columns, the interaction term between world price and local mining activity, 
our coefficient of interest, is positive and significant at the 1 or 5 percent level. 
Thus, a spike in mineral prices increases the conflict risk in cells producing these 
commodities. We estimate equation (1) on the full sample of cells. In column 1, 
mining activity (mine  > 0 ) is measured with a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 
1 mine is active in the cell in year  t . Cell fixed effects are included with the purpose 
of controlling for time-invariant codeterminants of violence and mining at the local 
level—such as weak state capacity and property rights enforcement in remote places 
or latent political instability (e.g., ethnic cleavages). Country  × year fixed effects 
also are included to filter out all country-wide time-varying characteristics affecting 
violence and activity of mines: for example, a war-induced collapse of the central 
state and property rights.
In column 2, we estimate equation (2) on the subsample of cells without mine 
opening/closing (i.e.,  V( M kt ) = 0 for a given  k ). In column 3 we go beyond spa-
tial clustering of standard errors in addressing spatial dependence in the data. To 
this purpose we allow for spatial lags of our explanatory variable by including the 
19 Robustness to alternative spatial and temporal kernels is explored in online Appendix Section F. We have 
created a new STATA routine based on the one from Hsiang, Meng, and Cane (2011) (ols_spatial_HAC.ado) and 
its extension to multidimensional fixed effects by Thiemo Fetzer (reg2hdfespatial.ado: itself based on the work of 
Guimaraes and Portugal 2010). Our routine also enables 2SLS estimations (in samples of limited size given the 
current STATA limitations). 
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interaction term between mineral price and mining activity in neighboring cells of 
degrees 1 and 2.20 As shown by the coefficient of the second interaction term, we 
detect an impact on local conflict of mineral price shocks in neighboring cells. The 
effect is 60 percent lower than for the cell itself (i.e., the first interaction term) 
confirming that conflict tends to spill over with spatial decay, a feature that is likely 
to be driven by spatial diffusion of violence (e.g., roaming bands of fighters).21 
In column 4 we use the alternative definition of mining activity where the mining 
dummy (mines  > 0 ever) is now equal to 1 for cells where at least one mine has 
been recorded as active at any point over the 1997–2010 period. The coefficient 
of interest is slightly lower, an expected feature given that in this specification we 
define as mining areas places where mining took place in at least one year of the 
20 More precisely, we also impose the constraint of no closing/opening mines for neighboring cells. Therefore 
ln price  × mines  > 0 (neighboring cells) corresponds to the price of the main mineral produced among the neigh-
boring cells with permanent mining activity. 
21 Our favorite interpretation of the results in column 3 is that violence diffuses in space. Henceforth, this spec-
ification could be viewed as the reduced form of a TSLS estimate of a variant of equation (2) that would include on 
the RHS violence in neighboring cells instrumented by price shocks in neighboring cells. We do not want to push 
this interpretation too far as it could be that spatial dependence is simply driven by measurement errors on the actual 
surface of mining areas that are constrained by data construction to be contained in a 0.5 degree  × 0.5 degree-cell. 
Technically this additional channel could violate the exclusion restriction of the TSLS. 
Table 2—Conflicts and Mineral Prices
Estimator LPM
Dependent variable Conflict incidence
Sample All  V( M kt ) = 0 All  V( M kt ) = 0 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mine  > 0 0.112 0.048
(0.065) (0.065)
 ln price main mineral −0.029 0.028
(0.032) (0.019)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 0.086 0.072 0.060 0.085 0.108
(0.034) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.041)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 (neighboring cells) 0.021
(0.006)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 (ever) 0.045
(0.014)
Country  × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Year fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
Cell fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Neighborhood fixed effects No No No No No Yes
Observations 143,768 142,296 127,974 143,864 142,296 17,360
Notes: LPM estimations. Conley (1999) standard errors in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within a 
500 km radius and for infinite serial correlation. Variables: mine  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 
1 mine is active in the cell in year  t ; mines  > 0 (ever) is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is recorded in 
the cell at any point over the 1997–2010 period; mines  > 0 (neighboring cells) is a dummy taking the value 1 if at 
least 1 mine is recorded in neighboring cells of degree 1 and 2 in year  t ;  V( M kt ) = 0 means that we consider only 
cells in which the mine dummy (or dummies in column 3) takes always the same value over the period. Column 6 
is estimated on a sample containing only mining cells and their immediate neighboring cells. In columns 1 to 5,  ln 
price main mineral is the world price of the mineral with the highest production over the period (evaluated at 1997 
prices) for mining cells, and zero for nonmining cells. In column 6,  ln price main mineral takes the same value for 
the mining cell and its immediate neighbors. Estimations (1) and (6) include controls for the average level of min-
eral world price interacted with the mine dummy.
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sample period. This leads to cells with currently inactive mines being treated as 
mining areas, resulting in potential attenuation bias.
The last two columns deal with alternative sets of fixed effects. Column 5 repli-
cates column 2 without the country  × year fixed effects. Indeed, with 15 percent of 
the cells belonging to more than one country, the interpretation of the unobserved 
heterogeneity that is captured by those fixed effects is unclear for border cells. 
Consequently we use year fixed effects only. In the sensitivity analysis in online 
Appendix Section L, we explore a more radical approach by dropping border cells. 
Column 6 implements the neighborhood fixed effects described earlier. We con-
centrate on the sample of mining cells and their immediate neighbors, and estimate 
the differential effect of mineral price variations in mining areas compared to their 
immediate neighbors. Our findings are confirmed; variations in mineral prices have 
a significantly higher effect in mining cells.
C. Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection we show that the baseline estimates of Table 2 are robust to a 
large battery of sensitivity checks.
Mining Activity.—We start by investigating the robustness of our results to alter-
native definitions of mining activity, to ensure further that our results are not driven 
by endogenous opening/closing of mines (i.e., variations in the mining dummy over 
time). Tables are relegated to the Appendix.
The first two columns of Appendix Table 8 contain our two baseline ways of 
dealing with this potential reverse causation issue: considering only cells with a 
permanently active mine (column 1, the same as column 2 in Table 2), and using a 
time-invariant dummy for cells containing at least one active mine at any point over 
the 1997–2010 period (column 2, the same as column 4 in Table 2). In column 3 of 
Table 8, we use a lagged mine dummy instead of the contemporaneous value. The 
estimated coefficient remains positive but becomes slightly insignificant. This is 
not our preferred way of dealing with reverse causality however, as mining activity 
can be affected by anticipation of future conflicts. In column 4, the mining variable 
is coded as 1 from the first year onward when an active mine is observed over the 
1997–2010 period, 0 if no active mine was ever recorded, and is coded as missing 
otherwise. Finally, we use mining activity at the beginning of the period (column 5) 
or in the presample period (5 years in column 6 and entire presample period covered 
by the RMD data in column 7). Our coefficient of interest is always highly signifi-
cant and quantitatively stable.22
We also inquire robustness to alternative size of the mining area. As discussed 
in Section II, the RMD dataset does not survey small-scale (potentially illegally 
operated) mines. Because of spatial clustering of mineral deposits, our main explan-
atory variable,  M kt , must be interpreted as a proxy for the extraction area of a given 
mineral rather than as coding for a specific RMD-referenced mine. But mining areas 
22 An alternative way of considering this endogeneity issue is to instrument the mining dummy in the sample 
period by its presample equivalent. This alternative is explored in online Appendix Section G and Table A.10. Very 
similar results emerge. 
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on average could be larger than our cells of a spatial resolution of 0.5  × 0.5 degree. 
Focusing on the impact of mines on the conflict likelihood in its surrounding cell 
of 0.5  × 0.5 degree may underestimate the real impact of being in a mining area. 
Hence, in Table 9 in the Appendix we broaden the scope of a mining area and we 
reproduce Table 2 for a grid of cells at a larger resolution (1 degree  × 1 degree).
Main Mineral and Mineral Prices.—Another important element of our analysis is 
the way in which we define the main mineral produced in the cell. Note that this has 
no impact on cells producing a single mineral, which comprise 70 percent of mining 
cells. For the others, we use the price of the mineral with the highest production 
over the period, evaluated at 1997 prices. In Table 10 in the Appendix we show that 
alternative coding choices deliver similar results. We consider our preferred baseline 
specifications, columns 2 and 4 of Table 2. We keep our baseline definition of the 
main mineral but restrict the sample, either to mining cells producing a single min-
eral over the entire period (columns 1–2) or to cells for which the main mineral is 
the same for each year of the sample (columns 3–4). In columns 5 and 6, we replace 
the price variable with the average price of all the minerals produced in the cells (for 
which we have a price), with weights equals to the share of each mineral in total 
production value over the period.
We also perform a series of consistency checks on mineral prices. In particular, 
we want to rule out that time-varying omitted variables could codetermine world 
prices and local violence in mining areas. Indeed, it could be the case that the resid-
ual unobserved heterogeneity still comoves with the world prices of minerals despite 
the wide array of fixed effects we include. We perform a placebo analysis to exclude 
this last concern and check the validity of our approach. Our idea is to replace the 
price of the mineral produced in the cell with the price of a mineral that is not pro-
duced in the cell. More precisely, we randomly assign a mineral to each of the min-
ing cells and estimate specifications (2) and (4) of Table 2 with this fake  M kt × ln  p kt W 
variable. We repeat this Monte Carlo procedure in 1,000 draws. Panels A and B of 
Figure 4 in the Appendix display the sampling distribution of the coefficient of the 
interaction term for each specification. Reassuringly, the Monte Carlo coefficients 
are distributed far from their baseline estimates and are massively insignificant. This 
confirms that our baseline results are not driven by comovements in mineral prices.
Alternative Definitions of Violence.—In all tables we focus on conflict inci-
dence, which reflects our interest in explaining the general presence of conflict. 
In this section we test for robustness to alternative measures of conflict in terms 
of intensity, onset, and ending. We first look at intensity of violence as measured 
by the yearly number of ACLED events reported in a given cell. The results are 
displayed in Appendix Table 11, where columns 2 and 4 of the baseline Table 2 
are replicated in panels A and B, respectively. For each panel, column 1 reports 
the LPM estimation results for the full sample. The distribution of the number of 
events being  right-skewed due to overreporting of intense events in ACLED,23 we 
23 Take for example the following event: “CNDD rebels attacked Kazirabageni in Makamba Province. They 
clashed with security forces and 15 people were killed.” It takes place from April 17–22, 2002 and each day is coded 
as a separate event in ACLED. 
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deal with  outliers by winsorizing at top 5 percent in column 2 and at 2 SD above 
the mean in column 3. We redo the same exercises in columns 4–6 with a Poisson 
 pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator—a well-adapted procedure for count data. 
The results are again better estimated when extreme values are treated. This feature 
suggests that mineral prices impact violence intensity in a nonlinear (concave) way. 
We investigate further this interpretation in the last two columns by estimating a 
LPM on the full sample with a  log (1 + x) transformation of the LHS variable (col-
umn 7) and an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (column 8). Finally we study 
cell-specific onsets and endings of conflict separately in Section D of the online 
Appendix, and in particular in Tables A.6 and A.7. Note that this exercise has a 
limited scope in the context of our spatial microdata where, at the cell level, the vast 
majority of events is short lived.24 Finally, we complement our sensitivity analysis 
on violence measurement by using an alternative conflict database with geocoded 
information, namely the Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Events Dataset 
(UCDP-GED). The UCDP-GED focuses on deadly incidents associated with civil 
wars, as identified by the UCDP-PRIO Armed Conflict Database. All these results 
are displayed and discussed in Section E of the online Appendix.
Other Robustness Checks.—We perform various additional sensitivity checks that 
are discussed in details in the online Appendix. For the sake of brevity we simply list 
them here: (i) we investigate alternative spatial and temporal kernels in the compu-
tation of standard errors (Section F); (ii) we instrument world prices  × actual mines, 
using world prices  × historical mines as instrument (Section G); (iii) we remove 
from the estimation sample all cells located in a top-10 world producer of the main 
mineral produced in the cell (i.e., countries that could have some influence on world 
prices) (Section H); (iv) we show that our results are robust to the inclusion of 
diamond and coltan (tantalum) mines in the sample, and that they are not driven 
by any specific mineral, by excluding sequentially each mineral from the sample 
(Section I); (v) we use a nonlinear (logit) fixed effects estimator instead of a LPM 
(Section J); (vi) we use, instead of our binary mining variable, the number of mines 
or total production of the main mineral as measures of the intensity of mining activ-
ity in the cell (Section K); (vii) border cells are removed from the sample to ease 
the interpretation of the country  × year fixed effects (Section L); (viii) we consider 
price shocks in log differences rather than in levels (Section M); (ix) we include 
time-varying climate variables (rainfall and temperature) which might be correlated 
with commodity price variations (Section N); (x) we test for nonclassical measure-
ment errors affecting our mining data points following the approach by König et al. 
(forthcoming) (Section O).
24 Indeed the potential issue with using conflict incidence as a dependent variable has been raised by the 
 macro-level literature. Conflict being a persistent variable, one should estimate a dynamic model with the lagged 
conflict variable included on the right-hand side, or equivalently, model onset and ending separately (Bazzi and 
Blattman 2014). The problem is less clear in our case as local conflict incidence is much less persistent than coun-
try-specific incidence. 
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D. Country Characteristics and Mining-Induced Violence
Is the abundance of valuable mines always a curse for political stability? Minerals 
could exacerbate instability in countries where the conflict risk already is latently 
present due to social cleavages or weak institutions. Minerals may not necessarily 
be the root cause of conflicts, but they could facilitate them, a mechanism we inves-
tigate in detail in the second part of the paper. In this subsection we consider how 
country characteristics may modify the average effect of mineral price variations on 
local conflicts.
Inequality and Diversity: How Does the Social Fabric Matter?—Social cleavages 
are considered in the literature as important sources of grievances and conflicts. A 
natural question is to assess whether these also amplify mining-induced violence.25 
We consider a battery of indicators of social cleavages at the country and cell lev-
els. Starting from our preferred specifications (columns 2 and 4 of Table 2), we 
include triple interactions between our main explanatory variable  ( M k × ln  p kt W ) and 
the indicators of social cleavages. Table 12 in the Appendix displays the results. 
We focus on: (i) the Gini index of gross income distribution (Solt 2014); (ii) ethnic 
and religious fractionalization or polarization (Reynal-Querol 2014); and (iii) the 
presence of indigenous group in the cell.26 The only variables which enter with sta-
tistically significant coefficients are indicators of religious fractionalization or polar-
ization. The results suggest that mining shocks have the strongest  conflict-inducing 
effects in religiously divided places.27 Note that this finding holds when we include 
fractionalization and polarization variables simultaneously.
Domestic Institutions: Can Good Governance Stop the Guns?—While natural 
resources often have been thought of as affecting the nature and quality of institu-
tions, relatively little attention has been paid to the impact of the interaction between 
institutional quality and natural resource abundance on political stability and pros-
perity.28 There are, however, reasons to expect natural resource extraction to have a 
stronger impact in weak states. It might be easier for local armed groups to extract 
rents from mining areas in such countries.
We follow the same methodology as in Table 12 to estimate the coefficients of 
the triple interactions between our main explanatory variable and indexes of insti-
tutional quality  iq i : a binary variable equal to 1 when a country’s presample (1996) 
25 There is a small literature finding that the resource curse is most present in ethnically fractionalized countries 
(see, e.g., Hodler 2006). 
26 We build the binary variable  Indigenous that takes a value of 1 if all groups in a given cell are indigenous. 
By contrast,  Indigenous takes a value of 0 if there is at least one non-indigenous group in the cell. For the sake 
of statistical analysis we prefer this coding rule to the alternative option of coding for indigenous presence (i.e., at 
least one indigenous group in the cell) because in quasi all cells there is at least one indigenous group. The list of 
ethnic groups and information on their location is from Cederman, Buhaug, and Rød (2009). Drawing on a variety 
of sources, we have coded for each ethnic group whether it is  Indigenous in a given country (i.e., settled in a place 
for several centuries). 
27 In our sample, the five most religiously divided countries in terms of ethnic polarization are Ethiopia, 
Botswana, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (in terms of fractionalization, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire replace the last 
two countries). 
28 See Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) and Andersen and Aslaksen (2008). 
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 institutional score is above the sample median.29 All variables used are described 
in online Appendix Section A. Appendix Table 13 displays the results. We use (i) a 
standard and synthetic measure of institutional quality at country-level (International 
Country Risk Guide); (ii) four more specific indicators of institutional quality: gov-
ernment effectiveness, rule of law, voice and accountability, and control of corrup-
tion;30 and (iii) the standard democracy score of Polity IV. The coefficient of the 
triple interaction with Voice and Accountability is positive in both columns, but 
statistically significant only in column 3. Further, the coefficient of the triple inter-
action with control of corruption in both columns is negative, and statistically signif-
icant in column 4, indicating that the impact of mining price spikes on conflict may 
be lower in countries with stronger anti-corruption measures.
In a nutshell, we do not detect big heterogeneous effects for different institutional 
arrangements. Note that our country-level institutional measures are crude proxies, 
and our results may suffer from attenuation bias. Indeed, the last section of our paper 
shows that anti-corruption and transparency measures have a significant impact on 
specific types of events and mining companies.31
E. Mineral Characteristics
We now study whether our results generalize to all types of minerals or if some 
subgroup of minerals, with specific characteristics are particularly conflict-prone.
Labor- versus Capital-Intensiveness.—The labor- versus capital-intensiveness 
of a given commodity has been linked to conflict in the literature. In a general- 
equilibrium framework where (labor-intensive) appropriative activities compete for 
recruiting manpower with labor-intensive production, it has been shown that only 
a price spike in the capital-intensive sectors fuels conflict, while higher prices in 
labor-intensive sectors do not jeopardize peace (Dal Bó and Dal Bó 2011). Dube 
and Vargas (2013) provide empirical evidence in line with this reasoning, comparing 
the effect of commodities price variations in coffee-abundant versus  oil-abundant 
municipalities in Colombia.
To investigate this question, we have built a number of mineral-specific prox-
ies of capital-intensiveness (see data description in online Appendix Section A). 
It turns out that capital-intensiveness is difficult to measure because of the high 
 within-mineral diversity in production methods and types of mines and opaque 
communication of commodity firms. Note also that our exercise has limited com-
parability with Dube and Vargas (2013) because variation in capital-intensiveness 
between coffee and oil production is huge, while in our case cross-mineral varia-
tions in  capital-intensiveness are modest.
29 We use presample scores to mitigate endogeneity concerns. We focus on the year 1996 as many of the insti-
tutional variables are not available for earlier years. 
30 We make use of the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2013). 
The indicators of this dataset are based on a great number of individual variables from 32 data sources. These four 
individual measures are mapped into clusters of key dimensions of government quality, with higher scores indicat-
ing better governance. 
31 The type of corruption may also matter: In Section P of the online Appendix we study how corruption at the 
port affects the impact of mineral prices variations on conflict. We find stronger evidence of a conflict-inducing 
effect of our proxy of port-level corruption. 
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We consider three different proxies of capital-intensiveness using data from 
RMD. For a given metal, open cast is defined as the average percentage of mines 
in Africa that use, at least for part of their extraction, the open-cast (respectively, 
open-pit) mining method. Open-cast is often argued to be a particularly capital- 
intense mining method.32 The second proxy, energy intensity , corresponds to 
the ratio of ln(Energy/Production) over ln(Employees/Production). The third 
proxy, mine age , is the number of years since mining activity started in a given 
cell with the assumption that older mines on average should be relatively less 
 capital-intensive. Obviously mine age is a crude proxy of capital-intensiveness and 
it may also correlate with other factors, such as, e.g., environmental grievances of 
local stakeholders. Results are shown in Table 14 in the Appendix. We focus on the 
triple interaction term between our main explanatory variable  ( M k × ln  p kt W ) and 
each proxy of capital-intensiveness. None of these coefficients is statistically sig-
nificant. A possible interpretation is that all our minerals are capital-intensive in 
absolute terms, and that they are not different enough in terms of technology to have 
detectable heterogeneous effects on conflicts.33 
Rents, Lootability, and Bulkiness.—The literature has argued that more precious 
commodities generating larger rents are more conducive to fighting. Larger rents 
do not only increase the prize to be appropriated by the winner, but also consti-
tute attractive opportunities for appropriation and looting during the conflict, help-
ing rebel groups to fund their activities. What also matters besides the value of a 
resource is the relative ease with which it can be extracted. Resources that are easier 
to find, that can be exploited using artisanal tools, and that are easier to transport 
are more lootable, i.e., easier for rebels to appropriate. Further, the recent paper by 
Sanchez de la Sierra (2015) makes the point that bulky commodities lead violent 
actors to impose monopolies of violence and sustain taxation. Bulkiness seems to 
have several countervailing effects as far as conflict is concerned. Bulky metals usu-
ally are very diluted in the stone, which is why they are often expensive, and hence 
an attractive loot. At the same time, they are harder to extract and transport, on the 
one hand lowering their attractiveness for looting, but on the other hand making it 
potentially easier to engage in extortion of local producers.
We consider three different proxies by which to study how minerals’ value, loot-
ability, and bulkiness may affect the nexus between price spikes and fighting (see 
Table 15 in the Appendix and Section A in the online Appendix for data information). 
First, we split the set of minerals into high versus low value-to-weight minerals. We 
interact our main explanatory variable with two mutually exclusive dummies coding 
for minerals with a 1997 price (in US$ per ton) above or below the sample median. 
32 Open-cast is often argued to be less labor-intensive than underground mining: “Underground methods from 
deep deposits (which) are generally more labor-intensive and expensive to mine than deposits mined by open-pit 
methods.” (ILO 1990, p. 18) 
33 We have also looked at the following additional proxies of capital-intensiveness: alternative measures of 
open-cast mining (average percentage of mines using open-cast technologies for a given mineral computed at the 
country, or cell level); alternative measure of open-cast mining using alternative data from Hargreaves and Fromson 
(1983); production-function-based estimates of capital-intensiveness; measures of average lead time to set up a 
mining site; share of artisan production for particular minerals (which is also related to the lootability of a given 
mineral, as discussed below). All of those proxies delivered similar results with a coefficient of the triple interaction 
that is nonsignificantly different from zero. Section Q in the online Appendix provides the results for some of these 
variables. 
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We find that the coefficient of interest is equal to 0.046 for minerals below median 
price , while for minerals above median price the analogous coefficient is almost 
twice as large (column 1). A similar picture emerges in column 2. This suggests 
that price spikes of more precious metals have a stronger  conflict-inducing effect—
consistent with recent evidence on mineral discoveries from Smits et. al (2016). 
Second, we interact the mining price shock with a dummy variable High rents 
that corresponds to the mineral-specific ratio of price over cost for all African mines 
being above the sample median. The coefficient of the triple interaction is nonsignif-
icant (columns 3 and 4). Last, we interact our price shock variable with a measure of 
average metal concentration in its corresponding ore (i.e., the ore grade). As pointed 
out above, bulky metals like platinum usually are very diluted in the stone and often 
expensive, while cheaper ones like iron have a larger ore grade.34 We find that the 
coefficient of the triple interaction is negative and significant (columns 5 and 6), 
suggesting that bulky/diluted metals entail a larger conflict risk when prices spike. 
This could be driven by the fact that they are more valuable, increasing the potential 
for looting. Moreover, mining companies extracting bulky minerals also have a hard 
time hiding production, making it easier for armed groups to control the mining site 
and engage in extortion.
F. The Nature of Mining-Induced Violence
From the Wild West to South Africa, mining areas are storied for danger and law-
lessness. They attract young and uneducated males; labor regulation is often lenient, 
not to say absent; property rights enforcement is a challenge, and this weak institu-
tional environment makes them particularly crime-prone (see Couttenier, Grosjean, 
and Sangnier forthcoming for statistical evidence on homicide rates in US mining 
areas). By nature, violence, rooted in riots and protests, is likely to be spatially con-
centrated around mining areas. By contrast, battles between fighting groups over 
the control of mines can spread to other areas as appropriation relaxes the financing 
constraints of future fighting capacity. Uncovering the nature of mining-induced 
violence is thus crucial for understanding whether it can escalate from the local to 
the global level. Here we provide evidence that different types of events (in terms of 
scale and objectives) are affected by changes in mineral prices.
In Table 3 we replicate our baseline specifications (columns 2 and 4 of Table 2) for 
each of the three categories of violent events covered by the ACLED dataset: battles 
between fighting groups, violence against civilians, and riots/protests. As expected, 
we find that an increase in mineral prices leads to more riots/protests (columns 5 
and 6) and more violence against civilians (columns 3 and 4). More important, how-
ever, the occurrence of battles is also significantly affected by changes in the value 
of mines, as shown in column 1, confirming that the appropriation of mines is a key 
driver of violence.35 In the specification of column 2, the coefficient of battles now 
34 It is important to keep in mind that we focus here on large-scale industrial mining production. Some precious, 
very diluted metals like gold may be bulky in industrial production yet much less bulky when extracted in artisan, 
alluvial depletion. 
35 The size of the coefficients is smaller here than in our baseline results, reflecting the fact that the uncondi-
tional probability of observing specific types of events is smaller than the probability of observing any type of event, 
as shown in Table 1. 
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loses statistical significance. In Section T of the online Appendix, we display the full 
set of results by replicating, for each category of violent events, all specifications of 
the baseline Table 2. As shown in Table A.26 for battles, with the exception of col-
umn 4, the coefficient of interest is positive and statistically significant throughout 
in all columns. Similarly, Tables A.27 and A.28 replicate the baseline Table 2 for 
violence against civilians and for riots, respectively. In both tables the coefficient of 
interest is statistically significant in 5 out of 6 columns.
G. Quantification
How large is the effect of mineral price variations on the probability of conflict? 
Taking the baseline specification of Table 2, column 2, a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the price of all minerals from their mean translates into an increase in this 
probability from 0.169 to 0.225. This is of sizable magnitude, but concerns only the 
cells where active mining takes place. When we also consider the surrounding cells 
(Table 2, column 3), conflict probability rises from 0.197 to 0.253.36
Over the period of our study, mineral prices more than doubled on average.37 
For instance, in constant 2005 US$, an ounce of gold was valued at $338 in 1997, 
and reached $1,084 in 2010. This spectacular rise of mineral prices over the 2000–
2009 period, known as the 2000s commodity boom or commodities super-cycle, 
has attracted quite a lot of attention. There is a consensus among scholars that no 
36 These numbers imply an increase in conflict probability of around 30 percent for a standard deviation increase 
in price (i.e., a 0.78 log point increase). Interestingly, these magnitudes are quite close in absolute terms to the 
(conflict-reducing) effect of agricultural commodities shocks found by the literature. For instance, Dube and Vargas 
(2013) find that a 68 percent fall in coffee prices in the average Colombian coffee-producing municipality results 
in a 14 to 31 percent increase in conflicts, depending on the conflict measure. Our point estimates are also similar 
in magnitude to the effect found using ACLED data by Berman and Couttenier (2015), who study how changes in 
foreign demand for agricultural commodities produced by sub-Saharan African region affect violence. 
37 Prices have been multiplied by 2.8 in constant US$. Figure A.4 in online Appendix Section A shows the 
evolution of the price of each of the minerals. 
Table 3—Minerals Price and Types of Conflict Events
LPM
Conflict incidence var. Battles Violence against civ. Riots/protests
Sample  V( M kt ) = 0 All  V( M kt ) = 0 All  V( M kt ) = 0 All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 0.016 0.040 0.044
(0.008) (0.014) (0.018)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 (ever) 0.002 0.034 0.038
(0.006) (0.010) (0.011)
Country  × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 142,296 143,864 142,296 143,864 142,296 143,864
Notes: LPM estimations. Conley (1999) standard errors in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within a 
500 km radius and for infinite serial correlation. Variables: mines  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 
1 mine is active in the cell in year  t ; mines  > 0 (ever) is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is recorded in 
the cell at any point over the 1997–2010 period;  V( M kt ) = 0 means that we consider only cells in which the mine 
dummy takes always the same value over the period;  ln price main mineral is the world price of the mineral with 
the highest production over the period (evaluated at 1997 prices) for mining cells, and zero for nonmining cells. 
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contraction of resource supply is to blame, but rather a rapid and substantial increase 
in demand, particularly so from the BRICS countries. As pointed out by Carter, 
Rausser, and Smith (2011, p. 107), “strong global demand, especially in lower- 
middle-income countries” helped set the stage for this commodity price boom, and 
“this strong demand was reflected in low real interest rates, a declining US dol-
lar, and strong GDP growth, and it contributed to the reduction in inventory levels 
that made commodity markets vulnerable to supply and demand shocks.” Similarly, 
Humphreys (2010, p. 1) points out that the great metals boom between 2003 and 
2008 “can be readily explained by the unusual strength of the demand shock and the 
lagged response of the supplying industry, with prices receiving an additional boost 
from the activities of commodity investors.”
What has been the effect of the commodity super-cycle on conflicts in Africa? In 
Figure 1, we compute, for each country with recorded mines, the contribution to the 
observed violence of this historical rise in mineral prices (see Figures A.7 and A.8 in 
the online Appendix for the map equivalent). The quantification being related to the 
number of conflict events, our exercise (panel A) is based on the PPML estimates 
from Table 11. Nevertheless, we also include the quantification based on LPM esti-
mates from Table 11 for the sake of robustness (panel B).38 In both cases the effect 
is highly heterogeneous across countries. Averaging across all countries with at least 
one recorded mine, we find that the historical rise in mineral prices contributed on 
average to 24 percent of the observed country-level violence using PPML estimates 
(14 percent using LPM). As is apparent in Figure 1, this number is however inflated 
by countries such as Mauritania, in which only a few conflict events are recorded 
(see online Appendix A.3).39 Effects on average are larger when computations are 
based on the sample with permanently active mines (see Table A.9 in the online 
Appendix).
We have several reasons to believe that these numbers are conservative estimates. 
First, our dataset is not exhaustive. Only two percent of the cells contain active 
mines; we consider surrounding cells as well, but many small-scale mines are not 
included, although they may have a significant impact on violence, contributing to 
the one we identify here. Further, not all minerals are taken into account in these 
38 More precisely, we compute the counterfactual share of events that would not have happened if prices 
had stayed stable across the entire period. The PPML estimator is our preferred one given the nature of the data. 
However, we cannot include country  × year in these estimations. For this reason we complement these results 
with LPM estimates because LPM allows the inclusion of two large sets of fixed effects. In both cases, we use as 
baseline sample B of Table 11 (i.e., define mining areas as cells in which a mine was active at some point), which 
allows keeping all cells in the sample and taking into account the effect of mineral price variations in both mining 
cells and their neighbors. Here is the detail of our quantification procedure: (Step 1) We estimate specifications 
similar to columns 5 and 2 of Table 11 where we add the price of the main mineral in neighboring cells of degree 1 
and 2; (Step 2) we compare for each year and cell the predicted number of events for the observed prices with the 
counterfactual prediction when prices are set at their 1997 level; (Step 3) we sum events across cells and years for 
each country; (Step 4) we take the ratio of these counterfactual prevented events over the total number of events 
observed in the country during the 1998–2010 period. 
Figures A.5 and A.6 in the online Appendix show, by cell, the predicted decrease in the conflict probability 
that would be observed in 2010 if the prices were the same as in 1997. When aggregated at the country level as in 
Figure 1, the magnitude of the effect obviously varies with the number of mining areas in the country. 
39 When we adopt a more conservative approach and consider only countries with more than 50 events observed 
over the period, we find that the observed rise in mineral prices contributed to a 16 percent of the observed violence 
(8 percent in LPM estimations). Alternatively we can aggregate violence at the continental level. In that case the 
contribution of mineral prices to violence ranges from 7.7 percent in PPML estimations to 3.5 percent in LPM esti-
mations, reflecting the fact that increases in prices have a relatively small effect on the countries in which the lion’s 
share of conflict events are recorded (Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo). 
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estimations. Second, and more important, so far our results only deal with the local 
and contemporaneous impact of mining on violence. In the next section, we empha-
size how mining can diffuse violence over space and time, by improving the finan-
cial means of armed groups.
IV. Feasibility and the Diffusion of Violence
So far our empirical analysis has focused on local violence, i.e., in the immedi-
ate surroundings of mining areas. As mentioned in the introduction, several mech-
anisms may be at play to explain our findings: rebel finance/feasibility; greed/
rent-seeking and secessionism; weak state capacity and extractive institutions; 
grievances; or migration/population changes.40 In this section and in Section V, we 
40 The opportunity cost channel—spikes in mineral prices generate increases in income and in the opportunity 
cost of rebellion—would go in the direction opposite to our findings. Section S in the online Appendix specifically 
considers the migration channel. More precisely, we try to determine whether our results are driven by population 
Figure 1. The Contribution of Rising Mineral Prices to Violence in Africa
Notes: These figures represent for each country the counterfactual share of events that would not have happened if 
prices had stayed stable at their 1997 level across the entire period. Predictions are based on an estimation similar 
to Table 11, panel B, column 5 and 2, except that we also include the interaction term between mineral prices and 
the mining dummy for neighboring cells.
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focus specifically on the feasibility channel, and provide various pieces of evidence 
suggesting that it is empirically relevant. The main objective of this section is to test 
for this mechanism by exploiting the various dimensions of our data—time-series, 
 geolocation, information on the outcome of the violent events, their type, and the 
identity of the perpetrators.
The main empirical challenge consists of retrieving information on the effective 
presence and influence of groups in mining territories. We follow two approaches. 
First, we assume that rebel groups benefit relatively more from the extractive rents of 
mines that are located in their ethnic homeland. If mining cash impacts the conflict 
risk partly through the mechanism of increased feasibility of financing rebellion, we 
expect rebel groups with more resource-rich homelands to thrive. This analysis has 
the statistical virtue of leading to a relatively large sample of mine-group combina-
tions. Still, the match between ethnic affiliation and effective control of mining rents 
may not always be fully accurate, as some groups operate far beyond their group 
homelands.
Hence, we also take a second approach using unique ACLED information on 
 battle-induced territorial changes in areas with or without mines. This is a more 
precise approach than the first one, but is based on a relatively small number of 
events. This second approach focuses on the diffusion over space and time of mining- 
induced violence, assessing whether mining activity is a factor of escalation from 
local violence to large-scale conflict. Of course, the feasibility of financing rebellion 
channel we wish to assess does not require that rebel groups fight elsewhere, i.e., 
spatial diffusion is not that a necessary condition for the presence of the feasibility 
channel. Still, the patterns of diffusion we observe are consistent with this channel, 
and difficult to explain by other channels alone. Thus, studying diffusion is not only 
interesting in itself, but provides additional suggestive evidence consistent with the 
view that mineral rents finance rebellions, i.e., make rebel movements easier to set up 
and sustain over time and space, or, put differently, make conflict feasible. The logic 
is that rebel groups, by controlling mining areas, can step up their military capacity 
and scale up their operations. This can result in spatial diffusion and escalation of 
the conflict. Rebel groups do not need to operate the mines themselves; they can also 
extract rents from mining areas through bribing/extortion, as discussed earlier.
In the following, we extend our dataset in a new dimension, namely the fighting 
group operating in each grid cell. We restrict our analysis to the 148 rebel groups 
that are active in our sample period, ignoring other types of fighting groups. ACLED 
considers as rebel groups “political organizations whose goal is to counter an estab-
lished national governing regime by violent acts.” We do not consider smaller 
groups (e.g., political militias and communal militias) because they are more local, 
and contrary to rebel groups, their objective is not to replace or change the political 
regime in power.41
changes/migration into mining areas caused by increases in prices. We fail to find significant effects of our mining 
price shocks on local population or nighttime lights. Similarly, the effect of mining prices on conflicts is not larger 
in cells located close to the capital city which have lower migration costs. 
41 This is the distinction that ACLED makes between these groups and rebel groups: “militia activity is orien-
tated toward altering political power to the benefit of their patrons within the confines of current regimes, whereas 
the goal of a rebel group is the replacement of a regime.” 
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A. Mines Located in Ethnic Homelands
We first test whether positive price shocks on the minerals extracted in the ethnic 
homeland of a rebel group boost its fighting operations. Exploiting ACLED infor-
mation on the identity of the rebel groups, we assign to each group a main ethnic 
affiliation, based on the ethnicity of the group’s leaders and troops. Of the 148 rebel 
groups in our sample, we are able to identify the presence or the absence of an 
ethnic affiliation for 109 groups (74 percent); the remaining groups are dropped 
from the analysis.42 Then we use the geocoordinates of ethnic homelands from the 
Georeferencing of Ethnic Groups (GREG) dataset (Weidmann, Rod, and Cederman 
2010) to build the number of mines and main minerals produced in the ethnic 
homeland of each armed group at the beginning of the sample period.43 We use 
a balanced dataset containing, for each rebel group, all combinations of countries 
 × years where the group potentially can be active. Here we allow each rebel group 
to be potentially present in all the countries in which it has been involved in at 
least one event over the period.44 Therefore, our unit of analysis is a rebel group 
 × country of operation  × year triplet  (g, i, t) . Table A.32 in the online Appendix 
contains some descriptive statistics on the sample used in this section. The uncon-
ditional probability of conflict incidence—0.21—is logically higher than at the cell 
level. Conflict is also more likely within the boundaries of the rebel group’s home-
land, and in ethnic homelands containing mining areas.
We now study how conflict incidence at the rebel group-country level is affected 
by mineral prices in the ethnic homeland of the group, and we estimate the follow-
ing specification:
  Conflic t git =  β 1 ln  p gt W +  β 2 ln  p gt W ×  M g + F E gi + F E it +  ε gt , 
where Conflict git is a dummy coding for the incidence of a conflict involving 
group  g in country of operation  i during year  t . The variable  ln  p gt 
W is the world price 
of the main mineral produced by mines located in the homeland of the main ethnic-
ity of rebel group  g (the mineral observed in the largest number of cells; robustness 
results using the prices of all minerals aggregated into a price index are discussed 
below) and  M g is the number of mines producing this mineral in the homeland at 
the beginning of the period. The coefficient of interest,  β 2 , is a proxy for the min-
ing-related financial capacity of the group. We expect it to have a positive sign, as 
better-funded groups are able to extend their fighting operations. Note that this is a 
somewhat imprecise proxy for effective control of the mining rents—and subject to 
42 Examples of matches are: Lord’s Resistance Army, that is linked to the Acholi ethnic group; National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, that is composed of Tuaregs; and Ogaden National Liberation Front, that 
is associated to the Somali ethnic group. 
43 GREG includes the geographical location of all ethnic groups, based on the widely used Soviet Atlas Narodov 
Mira from 1964. While this atlas has the downside of being dated, it has the advantage of addressing concerns of 
reversed causation that would arise if we were to use current ethnic group homelands (i.e., our dependent variables, 
conflict in the year 2000, could affect current group location). Note that the main competing dataset, GeoEPR, 
suffers from the fact that it includes only ethnic groups that are judged as politically relevant, which could result in 
a selected sample. 
44 For instance, the Lord’s Resistance Army is assumed to be potentially operating in all cells of Central African 
Republic, DRC, Sudan, and Uganda. 
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measurement errors—as the historical ethnic homelands information corresponds to 
a snapshot of the 1960s.
Table 4 displays the estimation results (only interaction terms reported). In col-
umn 1, the dependent variable is (unrestricted) conflict incidence accounting for 
violence involving the rebel group  g within country of operation  i inside and outside 
its ethnic homeland. We control for group-country fixed effects and for year fixed 
effects. As expected, the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant. Column 2 shows that the results of column 1 are robust to controlling for 
country-year fixed effects instead of year fixed effects.45 In columns 3 and 4 we rep-
licate the specifications of columns 1–2 with a restricted definition of the dependent 
variable that now accounts for conflict incidence involving  g in country  i , but only 
45 The reason why we favor year fixed effects in this table is two-fold. First, given the small number of obser-
vations, country  × year results in a massive loss of degrees of freedom. Second, in columns 5 and 6 where we split 
price variations in several components—in the country, inside and outside homelands—the inclusion of country 
× year dummies would lead to a collinearity problem. 
Table 4—Feasibility: Mines in Ethnic Homelands 
Estimator LPM
Dependent variable Conflict incidence
Conflict zone Unrestricted Outside ethnic homelands Unrestr.
Outside 
ethn. homel.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln price main mineral
 (homeland in country)
   × number of mines 0.562 0.284 0.374 0.141 0.979 0.717
(0.012) (0.119) (0.091) (0.111) (0.167) (0.212)
ln price main mineral
 (entire homeland)
   × number of mines −0.107 −0.096
(0.047) (0.034)
ln price main mineral
 (in country outside homeland)
   × number of mines 0.034 0.031
(0.020) (0.020)
Group  × country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Country  × year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No No
Observations 2,352 2,226 2,352 2,226 2,352 2,352
Notes: LPM estimations. Standard errors, clustered by group, in parentheses. The unit of observation is the rebel 
group-country-year. Sample without mine opening/closing over the period. Columns 3, 4, and 6 keep in the sample 
only cells which are located outside the ethnic homeland associated with the rebel group. Variables: ln price main 
mineral (homeland in country) is the price of the main mineral produced in the ethnic homeland of the rebel group 
and in the considered country; ln price main mineral (entire homeland) is the price of the main mineral produced in 
the ethnic homeland of the rebel group, inside or outside the considered country; ln price main mineral (in country 
outside homeland) is the price of the main mineral produced inside the considered country but outside the ethnic 
homeland of the rebel group; main minerals are defined as the mineral produced in the largest number of cells at 
the beginning of the period. For each price variable, the associated number of mines variable denotes the number 
of mines producing the mineral in each respective area. All specifications include linear terms and interaction terms 
but only the coefficients of the interactions are displayed. 
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outside the ethnic homelands of the rebel group. The estimates are similar (although 
below conventional statistical significance in column 4). This finding suggests that 
a rise in the price of minerals extracted in their ethnic homelands enables groups to 
increase their fighting activity outside their homeland. This is a first piece of evi-
dence documenting the spatial diffusion of mining-induced violence.
In columns 5 and 6 we assess the role of international/ethnic borders by building 
an additional set of variables coding for minerals extracted in different geographic 
areas. More specifically for a given group  × country of operation  × year triplet, 
(g, i, t) , we consider a second interaction term between log prices and the number 
of mines in the entire homeland of  g (inside or outside  i ) and a third interaction 
term between log prices and the number of mines located in  i but outside the home-
land of  g ; note that all the linear terms are also included (their point estimates are 
unreported). Column 5 displays the results for the unrestricted definition of conflict 
incidence and column 6 for the restricted one. As for the role of international bor-
ders, we find that the estimated coefficient of the second interaction term is negative 
(−0.107) and significant at the 5 percent level. Together with the positive coeffi-
cient (0.979) of the first interaction term (price shocks impacting only the ethnic 
homeland of  g in  i ), this finding suggests that international borders affect how price 
shocks translate into additional funding for rebel groups. Following an increase in 
mineral prices in the part of the ethnic homeland located in another country, an 
armed group  g operating in country  i tends to experience a reduction in its fighting 
activity. Our interpretation is that the now richer coethnics abroad may prefer to 
fund local rebels who may be better placed to get their hands on the now more lucra-
tive resource rents in the foreign country. Note that the sum of the two coefficients 
is positive (0.979 − 0.107 = 0.872), which implies that the overall conflict proba-
bility increases after a price shock in the ethnic homeland; but the conflict tends to 
relocate in the country where the mines are. As for the role of ethnic borders, we find 
that the estimated coefficient of the third interaction term is positive, but 30 times 
smaller than the coefficient of the first interaction term. This evidence supports our 
hypothesis that rebel groups benefit relatively more from the extractive rents of 
mines located in their ethnic homeland. Finally, it is worth mentioning that these 
results are to be viewed with caution: the main coefficients are identified thanks to 
the few rebel groups whose ethnic homeland is spread over several countries and 
contain mines producing distinct minerals.46
B. Changes in Territory
A second approach consists in assessing directly the impact of conquering a min-
ing area after a victorious battle on groups’ future fighting activity. For each battle, 
our data detail the name and type of fighting groups on each side (government, rebel 
groups, militias, foreign powers, civilians) and the outcome of the battle (who won 
46 Online Appendix Section U contains supplementary material. In particular we replicate in Table A.30 the 
results of Table 4, but using a weighted price index of all minerals present instead of the price of the main mineral. 
To capture the diffusion of violence from mining areas to nonmining areas, we replicate in Table A.31 the results of 
Table 4 when restricting the dependent variable to conflicts occurring in cells located outside mining areas. 
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and gained (or kept) the territory). As discussed above, this information allows for 
studying diffusion and helps identifying the feasibility mechanism.
We build a balanced dataset containing, for each rebel group, all combinations of 
grid cells  × years where the group can potentially be active (i.e., all cells located in 
the countries of operation of the group). Therefore, our unit of observation is now a 
grid cell  × year  × rebel group. Our idea is to test whether a change in territory has 
more effect on future rebel activity elsewhere if the territory is a mining area. To 
test for this diffusion over space and time of mining-induced battles, we restrict our 
analysis to rebel groups that have been active in period  t − 1 and estimate a LPM 
of the probability of outbreak of a new event involving a group  g in cell  k in year  t :
 (3) onse t gkt = α × battl e gt−1 0 + β × battl e gt−1 m + F E gk + F E it +  ε gkt , 
where  F E gk are group  × cell fixed effects, and  F E it are country of operation 
 × year fixed effects. Here,  onse t gk, t is a binary variable equal to 1 if group  g is 
involved in an event in year  t in a cell  k that was at peace in  t − 1 ; it is 0 if the cell 
is still in peace in year  t . Notice that we deliberately focus on event outbreak and 
not on incidence; henceforth the observation is dropped out of the sample if  g per-
petrates violence in  k in  t − 1 . Our main explanatory variables are battl e g, t−1 m and 
battl e g, t−1 0 . The first corresponds to the total number of battles won by group  g 
in  t − 1 in mining areas; the second is the number of battles won in  t − 1 in non-
mining areas.47 The two coefficients  α and  β could be either positive or negative 
depending on the underlying process governing the dynamics of battles: negative 
if battle occurrence is mean-reverting; positive in the presence of unobserved tran-
sient shocks that, for example, impact the fighting capacity of a group. However, 
our test of the spatial and time diffusion of mining-induced violence does not rest 
upon the absolute level of these coefficients but on their relative value, as we expect 
β > α: winning in  t − 1 a territory containing active mining increases the proba-
bility of battle onset in other cells in  t more than winning a territory with no active 
mine. The implicit assumption here is that winning a battle in a mining area enables 
rebel groups to appropriate mining rents. In all specifications, the standard errors are 
clustered at the same level than our main explanatory variables, namely at the rebel 
group level (we explore other levels of clustering in the robustness analysis).
Before turning to regression results, we first report some simple statistics (see 
also Table A.32 in online Appendix). The sample size is larger (204,402 observa-
tions) as the unit of observation is now a grid cell  × year  × group. It contains 126 
groups operating in 32 countries. Each group operates in 1.7 countries on average 
(with a maximum of 6 countries). The dependent variable  onse t gk, t is equal to 1 for 
2,019 observations (0.99 percent of the observations). The number of battles won in 
t − 1 is positive for 42 percent of observations. Among these, 4 percent correspond 
to battles won in mining areas (2,940 observations). This may seem to be a large 
amount of observations, but it actually represents only 1.4 percent of the sample size 
and 54 events. This data limitation prevents us from including an interaction term 
with the world price of minerals.
47 We include the establishment of headquarters in the battles won, as it is also a case of rebel groups gaining 
the territory. 
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Table 5 displays the regression results. Only the subsample of rebel groups active 
in  t − 1 is considered. In column 1 the explanatory variable corresponds to the total 
number of battles won by a rebel group in the previous period. From column 2 
onward, we estimate equation (3) where battles won in mining areas are accounted 
for separately from those won in nonmining areas. While in column 2 the two vari-
ables of battles won are binarized, in column 3 we look at the number of battles won. 
In both cases, we find that  β is statistically significantly larger than  α . This finding 
shows that the appropriation of mining areas increases the probability of perpetrat-
ing violence elsewhere in the territory one year after. We interpret it as supportive of 
the view that mineral rents finance rebellions.
One potential selection bias in our estimation could arise if groups attacking 
mines have unobserved characteristics different from the groups engaged in battles 
in nonmining areas. Note, however, that time-invariant group differences are filtered 
out by group  × cell fixed effects. Still, time-varying group characteristics could cor-
relate with the decision to fight in mining areas, e.g., a situation where groups get 
stronger or weaker over time and only dare attack a mine when they are strong. To 
check that our results are not driven by such unobserved transient shocks affecting 
groups’ fighting capacity, we include in column 4 measures of battles fought inside/
outside mining areas that did not result in a change of territory. The absence of terri-
torial change does not necessarily mean that the rebels lost, but rather could indicate 
an indecisive battle or a situation where rebels successfully managed to keep control 
of previously conquered territory. Still, we expect the effect to be larger when rebels 
manage to conquer the mining territory. The estimation results confirm our previous 
finding that  β is statistically significantly larger than  α . Interestingly, for battles in 
mining areas, the coefficient associated with the absence of territorial change is five 
times smaller than the one associated with winning a battle, in line with the logic 
described above.
We now document the time and spatial decays. In columns 5 and 6 we include 
battles won in  t − 2 and in  t − 3 , and our main finding can be observed at different 
time lags (i.e.,  β > α ). Columns 7–8 start from specifications of columns 1 and 3 
and add interaction terms between the lagged battles variables and their average dis-
tance to the cell’s centroid. A clear pattern of spatial decay emerges. This evidence 
can be seen in more details in Figure 2 where we have plotted the marginal effect of 
battles won in  t − 1 on the probability of conflict onset in  t as a function of distance 
to the battles (based on the estimates of column 8). The change in conflict probabil-
ity is small and nonsignificant if a territory containing no mine was won (panel A). 
In cases where battles occurred in mining areas (panel B), the probability increases 
by up to 20 percentage points in the areas surrounding the battles, and remains sig-
nificant up to 1,000 kilometers around. This clearly suggests that mining-induced 
violence does diffuse across space.
Finally we can quantify in a simple way the extent to which the conquest of a 
mining area exacerbates future violence. The appropriation of a mining area in year 
t increases by 4 percentage points the cell-level probability of an event occurring in 
year  t + 1 . Given that a rebel group is active in 335 cells on average, this leads to 
0.040 × 335 = 13.4 additional events (Table 5, column 2). This represents a tri-
pling in rebel fighting activity (average number of events by group-year being  3.78 ). 
Admittedly, this back-of-the-envelope calculation is very rough. But it supports the 
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Table 5—Feasibility and the Diffusion of War 
Conflict onset
Estimator LPM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
# battles g, t−1 0.002 0.033(0.002) (0.015)
Battle g, t−1 0 0.000(0.002)
Battle g, t−1 m 0.040(0.012)
# battles g, t−1 0 0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.000 0.029(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014)
# battles g, t−1 m 0.053 0.041 0.062 0.054 0.600(0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.184)
# battles g, t−1 0 (no change of terr.) 0.001(0.001)
# battles g, t−1 m (no change of terr.) 0.008(0.003)
# battles g, t−2 0 −0.000 0.000(0.001) (0.001)
# battles g, t−2 m 0.023 0.021(0.009) (0.008)
# battles g, t−3 0 −0.004(0.001)
# battles g, t−3 m 0.030(0.016)
ln average distance to battles t−1 −0.001 −0.001(0.003) (0.003)
# battles g, t−1 × ln av. dist. −0.005(0.002)
# battles g, t−1 0  × ln av. dist −0.004(0.002)
# battles g, t−1 m  × ln av. dist −0.084(0.027)
Difference in coefs.
# battles g, t−1 m − # battles g, t−1 0 0.039 0.056 0.042 0.061 0.053(0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
− no change of terr. 0.007
(0.003)
Country  × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group  × cell fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 168,887 168,887 168,887 168,887 168,887 158,040 168,887 168,887
Notes: LPM estimations. Standard errors, clustered by group, in parentheses. The unit of observation is the 
cell-rebel group-year. Only the sample of rebel groups active in  t − 1 is considered. Singletons are dropped. 
Variables: # battles g, t−1 , # battles g, t−1 0 , and # battles g, t−1 m are the number of battles won in  t − 1 , respectively in total, 
in nonmining areas and in mining areas; no change of terr. means that the number of battles with no change in ter-
ritory in considered; # battles variables are expressed as log  (x + 1) ; ln average distance to battles t−1 is the average 
distance between the cell and all previous year’s battles. 
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view that mining activity, arguably through the feasibility channel, is an important 
driver of escalation from local violence to large-scale conflict.48
V. Breaking the Resource Curse: The Role of Mining Companies
The previous section has focused on the role of fighting groups in mining- 
induced violence. But mining companies also may play an important part. In this 
section, we study specifically the role of companies’ characteristics and management 
practices on the presence of violence. A recent case reported by the NGO Global 
Witness (2016) illustrates our approach well. A Chinese mining company, Kun Hou 
Mining, is accused of having extracted gold from the Ulindi River in South Kivu 
(DRC) between 2013 and 2015 with the support of both local corrupt authorities and 
armed groups. To operate in the area and secure access, the company provided the 
armed groups operating on the banks of the river (the Raia Mutumboki militias) with 
money, rations, AK-47 rifles, and other items which allowed the militias to extort 
gold from artisanal miners extracting minerals in the same area. These activities 
occurred thanks to the cooperation of the local authorities of South-Kivu, which cov-
ered up the presence of Kun Hou Mining in the region and its links with local armed 
groups. Similarly, the governmental agency in charge of protecting local small-scale 
miners cooperated with the local militias to collect illegal taxes from the miners. 
No formal fiscal revenue from alluvial gold mining was recorded in the South-Kivu 
province over the period. Meanwhile, the gold was sold and smuggled to Dubai by 
48 Section V in the online Appendix contains additional results. Table A.33 uses spatially clustered standard 
errors and Table A.34 allows for two-way clustering of standard errors by group and cells. The significance levels 
are very similar to the ones reported in Table 5. Finally, in Table A.35 the dependent variable is outbreak of battle 
events only (instead of all events). 
Figure 2. Feasibility and the Spatial Diffusion of Conflicts 
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a trader from Bukavu, Alpha Gold. This story fits perfectly the main findings dis-
cussed below: the extraction by a foreign-owned company of a precious and easy-to-
smuggle mineral fueled conflict by providing local armed groups with financial and 
material means to sustain and enlarge their activities. Both bribery by the company 
and extortion by rebel groups were observed. Local corruption—in the extraction 
area and along the trading routes—played its part by facilitating and  participating in 
the entire process. Global regulations on transparency and traceability were ignored.
A. Companies’ Characteristics: Does Mine Ownership Matter?
By operating mines in conflict-prone environments, companies potentially 
become a central feature of the circumstances conducive to violence. At the local 
level, they could be more or less willing to secure mining areas where they plan to 
operate (e.g., with the help of governmental troops or private militias). Even more 
importantly, conflict may be escalated by companies propensity to finance, often 
through bribes or other illegal and opaque ways, the rebel groups that control the ter-
ritories surroundings the mines. The terms of an implicit agreement are often bribes 
that in exchange for protection by rebel groups in order to guarantee companies’ 
ability to operate in large-scale extraction. For these reasons, understanding the role 
of firms’ behavior is of foremost importance, both from a positive and policy per-
spective.49 To this end we exploit a unique feature of our dataset, i.e., its information 
on the identity of the owning company and the country of its headquarters.
Let us start with a brief overview of the companies present in our dataset 
(Table A.36 in the online Appendix displays more detailed descriptive statistics). 
Foreign-owned firms represent on average 60 percent of the companies; 12 percent 
of the mines are publicly owned by the domestic government and the residual cat-
egory is composed of domestic private firms. We should expect that not all foreign 
firms benefit from the same level of protection by the domestic government. As 
discussed in more detail below, there is a vast literature showing that firms from 
the  ex-colonizing power continue to benefit from privileged relationships with the 
new rulers after decolonization (see, e.g., Stockwell 2000; White 2000; Cain and 
Hopkins 2016). Henceforth, we distinguish between firms from a foreign colonizer 
country versus firms from a foreign country with no colonial ties to the country 
where the mine is located. Among foreign firms, roughly one-fifth have their head-
quarters located in the formerly colonizing country.
In Table 6, we investigate how the type of ownership impacts mining-induced 
violence. We start from the specification of column 2 of baseline Table 2.50 Mutually 
exclusive categories of ownership, foreign firms, domestic public firms, and 
domestic private firms are coded as the share of firms in a given cell belonging to 
this given category, and is interacted with our main effect  ( M k × ln  p kt W) . We retain 
the ownership status at the beginning of the sample period for the sake of  exogeneity 
49 While, as discussed above, there has been some related work on the impact of institutions on the resource 
curse, the modulating role of firm characteristics is severely under-studied. One of the reasons for this gap in the 
literature is that in most datasets precise firm characteristics are missing. 
50 We replicate in Table 16 the analogous analysis, focusing on the second baseline specification from the 
benchmark Table 2, namely column 4. The results are very similar for overall conflict incidence, but become weaker 
for battles (missing the conventional threshold for significance). 
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(i.e., self-selection). As these three shares sum up to 1, the baseline interaction term 
( M k × ln  p kt W ) is dropped from the specification to avoid collinearity. In all odd- 
numbered columns the dependent variable is conflict incidence, while in all even 
columns the dependent variable is restricted to incidence of battles only, for which 
the role of political protection and connections arguably are particularly salient.
Columns 1–2 of Table 6 display the coefficients of the interaction term for each 
category of ownership. In both columns the share of foreign firms has a positive and 
statistically significant impact, meaning that a larger presence of foreign firms mag-
nifies the impact of mineral price shocks on conflict. In contrast, we do not detect 
any statistically significant effect for domestic firms. This finding is consistent with 
at least two explanations. First, it could be that domestically owned companies are 
better protected by the national army and hence more resistant to capture by rebels 
(who are deterred to attack them), and/or second, it could be that domestic firms are 
more reluctant to pay bribes and extortion money, which would make indirect con-
trol of the mining area by rebel forces less lucrative. Of course, the two explanations 
may well be intertwined. A firm more protected by the state is less willing to give in 
to demands for protection money by rebels operating in a given area. By analogy, the 
fact that we find strongly significant effects for foreign firms is consistent with the 
view that mining areas operated by foreign firms are less well protected, and/or the 
view that foreign firms are more willing to pay extortion money to rebels.
Table 6—Mineral Price, Firm Ownership, and Conflicts 
Estimator LPM
Sample  V( M kt ) = 0 
Dependent variable Conflict incidence
Events All Battles All Battles All Battles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 ln price  × mines  > 0  × foreign firms 0.101 0.030
(0.038) (0.016)
 ln price  × mines  > 0  × dom. private firms 0.035 −0.002 0.034 −0.002 0.047 −0.007
(0.030) (0.006) (0.030) (0.006) (0.052) (0.017)
 ln price  × mines  > 0  × dom. public firms 0.027 −0.006 0.026 −0.007 0.026 −0.006
(0.037) (0.011) (0.036) (0.011) (0.036) (0.011)
 ln price  × mines  > 0  × fgn firms (col.) 0.022 −0.008 0.035 −0.012
(0.037) (0.026) (0.048) (0.025)
 ln price  × mines  > 0  × fgn firms (non col.) 0.150 0.053 0.159 0.050
(0.052) (0.020) (0.047) (0.022)
 ln price  × mines  > 0  × large firms −0.018 0.006
(0.054) (0.022)
Country  × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 142,072 142,072 142,072 142,072 142,072 142,072
Notes: LPM estimations. Conley (1999) standard errors in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within a 
500 km radius and for infinite serial correlation. Variables: mines  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 
1 mine is active in the cell in year  t ;  V( M kt ) = 0 means that we consider only cells in which the mine dummy takes 
always the same value over the period;  ln price main mineral is the world price of the mineral with the highest pro-
duction over the period (evaluated at 1997 prices) for mining cells, and zero for nonmining cells. The company 
characteristics (foreign, domestic public, domestic private, etc.) denote the share of mine owned by a given cate-
gory at the beginning of the period. Cells containing only mines with missing ownership information are dropped. 
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As mentioned above, it is reasonable to expect firms from former colonizers to 
have privileged access to government circles and to benefit from similar insider 
protection as domestic firms receive. For example, a US firm operating in a country 
with a traditionally left-leaning government may not be as well protected as a firm 
originating in a country with strong connections to the local elite, such as, say, a 
Belgian company operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or a British firm 
doing business in Ghana.51
In columns 3–4 we replicate columns 1–2 with the foreign firms category that 
is now split into foreign firms from former colonizer country (fgn firms (col.) ) 
and foreign firms without colonial ties (fgn firms (non col.) ). We find striking 
differences. Foreign firms with headquarters in the former colonizer country are 
very comparable to domestic state-owned firms as they are not associated with any 
political instability after mineral price shocks. In contrast, mines owned by foreign 
firms without colonial ties experience a quantitatively large, statistically significant 
effect on boosting the conflict potential when mineral prices rise.52 Again, this find-
ing could be due to greater vulnerability of mining firms in the absence of state 
protection, and/or to dirty business practices such as paying bribes and extortion 
money that could invite mining area takeovers by rebels. In columns 5–6, we repli-
cate the columns 3–4 and in addition control for the interaction with large firm , a 
dummy variable coding for large firms.53 The results are unchanged, meaning that 
the previous finding is not a sheer size effect.
B. Promoting Good Practices: Does Transparency Matter?
A government that is respectful of property rights may find it difficult to engineer 
the ownership status of mining companies operating in its national territory. Yet, 
policy interventions targeting bribing practices of mining companies might be able 
to curb conflict. International policy makers have recently started to promote trans-
parency and traceability in the mining industry. Examples include the US legislation 
requiring US firms to certify that their purchases of particular minerals are DRC 
conflict free, or the recent framework adopted by the EU commission (on June 16, 
2016) to force companies to track the origin of minerals produced in conflict-prone 
areas. In the same vein, several international initiatives aiming at encouraging good 
51 Indeed, there is a vast literature on the persistence of economic ties in the post-colonial era (see Cain and 
Hopkins 2016). For example, for the case of British companies in Ghana, Stockwell (2000, p. 237) points out that 
“businessmen, like other non-officials, experienced decolonization not just as passive observers of a constitutional 
readjustment, but as active participants in a complicated process involving the reorganization and adaptation of their 
activities, a reexamination of their employment policies, and a renegotiation of their relationships with a changing 
pattern of state structures and political forces” and that “established British companies continue to retain a strong 
presence in Ghana today.” Also White (2000, p. 545) concludes that British firms managed to maintain their influ-
ence after decolonization, and that “the transfer of political power for British firms in territories such as Malaya, the 
Gold Coast, and Kenya was favourable as independent regimes remained in the sterling area and chose development 
strategies heavily reliant on foreign investment. Even for territories where more statist development models were 
followed, such as Nigeria, British commercial banks, shipping lines, and import-export firms were remarkably 
successful in maintaining their positions.” 
52 The difference between the triple interaction coefficients of  foreign firms (colonizer) and  foreign firms 
(non colonizer) misses the conventional threshold for statistical significance in column 3 but is statistically 
significant in column 4. 
53 We use information provided by the RMD dataset about whether the owner of the mine is a major company, 
i.e., if the corresponding company belongs to the world top ten in terms of production of the corresponding mineral 
in a given year. About 60 percent or foreign firms belong to the group of these large multinational firms. 
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practices among extractive companies and tracking the origins of minerals are under-
way. For instance, the Mineral Certification Scheme of the International Conference 
on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) tracks the sales of gold, cassiterite, wolfram-
ite, and coltan. Similar certification efforts are observed in the tin and tantalum 
industries. Several countries have adopted international standards for managing the 
extractive rent in an open and accountable way, e.g., by fully disclosing royalties.
While many conceptual policy memos have been written on transparency and cer-
tification schemes, so far there is virtually no hard evidence on the  conflict-decreasing 
impact of these schemes in reality.54 We address this issue in Table 7. We take as the 
starting point column 2 of the baseline Table 2 and focus on a battery of triple inter-
actions. As before, all odd-numbered columns have conflict incidence as dependent 
variable, while the even columns restrict attention to battle incidence only. The anal-
ysis is restricted to foreign firms, which is the category of firms that drives most of 
the conflict-fueling effect of mining price spikes (see Table 6). These firms are likely 
to receive weaker government protection and may be more vulnerable to corruption 
and extortion, as discussed in the previous subsection. We exclude from the sample 
54 With the notable recent exception of Heffernan (2016), who look at the effect of the Kimberley Process using 
cross-country panel data and find a conflict-reducing effect. 
Table 7—Heterogeneous Effects: The Role of Transparency 
Estimator LPM
Sample  V( M kt ) = 0 
Dependent variable Conflict incidence
Events All Battles All Battles All Battles All Battles All Battles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
  ln price  × mines  > 0 0.002 0.028 0.045 0.043 0.066 0.048 0.045 0.043 0.062 0.025
(0.057) (0.036) (0.024) (0.025) (0.047) (0.038) (0.025) (0.026) (0.034) (0.021)
  × large firms 0.130 −0.013 0.120 −0.008 0.076 −0.023 0.092 −0.020 0.069 −0.003
(0.069) (0.039) (0.064) (0.032) (0.066) (0.039) (0.059) (0.034) (0.061) (0.028)
  × control of corruption −0.105 −0.041
(0.038) (0.016)
  × firm CSR (ICMM) −0.224 −0.085
(0.067) (0.038)
  × tracea. init. (EITI, request) −0.004 −0.001
(0.004) (0.002)
  × tracea. init. (EITI, comply) −0.007 −0.001
(0.003) (0.001)
  × tracea. init. (GLR) −0.004 0.005
(0.002) (0.004)
Country  × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 131,026 131,026 141,624 141,624 141,610 141,610 141,610 141,610 141,610 141,610
Notes: LPM estimations. Conley (1999) standard errors in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within 
a 500 km radius and for infinite serial correlation. Sample restricted to nonmining cells and cells for which for-
eign-owned mines represent the largest share. Variables: mines  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine 
is active in the cell in year  t ;  V( M kt ) = 0 means that we consider only cells in which the mine dummy takes always 
the same value over the period;  ln price main mineral is the world price of the mineral with the highest production 
over the period (evaluated at 1997 prices) for mining cells, and zero for nonmining cells. See main text for a descrip-
tion of the various transparency variables. 
1599Berman et al.: How minerals Fuel ConFliCts in aFriCaVol. 107 no. 6
all mines that are not foreign-owned. Note also that in all columns we control for the 
triple interaction with the dummy for large firms to account for scale effects.
In Appendix Table 13 discussed earlier, we found in the whole sample of mining 
companies and conflict events that mining price spikes had a somewhat attenuated 
impact in countries with a powerful control of corruption. In columns 1 and 2, we 
show that this result is reinforced in the case of foreign firms and battle events: 
the interaction of mining price shocks with  control of corruption , the measure 
already used in Table 13, is negative and significant at the 1 or 5 percent level.55 In 
columns 3 and 4, we interact mining price shocks with a variable representing the 
share of companies which are members of the International Council on Mining and 
Metals (ICMM), a network of companies promoting Corporate Social Responsibility 
in the mining industry.56 In both columns, the coefficient of the triple interaction 
with  CSR practices has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant, 
suggesting that corporate social responsibility can indeed build viable resistance to 
the resource curse.
Could top-down initiatives at the country level to foster good practices also have 
this dampening effect? In columns 5–10, we look at two country-level transparency 
initiatives, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Mineral 
Certification Scheme of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
(ICGLR). The former initiative holds its member countries accountable to fully dis-
close taxes and payments made by mining companies to their governments; the 
latter tracks the origin of a number of metals. Among other things, the ICGLR aims 
at identifying mines which are related to conflicts, e.g., through illegal control, tax-
ation, or extortion.57
In each specification, we interact mineral prices with a dummy coding for coun-
try membership (for the relevant minerals in the case of ICGLR). For the EITI 
initiative, we use data on the country-specific dates of EITI membership from 
Papyrakis, Rieger, and Gilberthorpe (2017). We first use the date at which the 
country becomes a candidate country. The application process generally lasts sev-
eral years, at the end of which the country produces and submits a validation report 
that shows compliance with the EITI criteria and establishes the country case for 
membership in the initiative. As a second indicator, we use the year during which 
the validation report was submitted.58 In columns 5–6 we code a country as EITI 
55 An alternative to focusing on country-level measures of corruption is to use corruption proxies at a more 
disaggregate level, which may be less noisy. In online Appendix Section P, we rely on gaps in the declarations of 
importers and exporters as a proxy for port-level corruption, finding evidence consistent with the notion that our 
proxy of port-level corruption may induce conflict. 
56 See http://www.icmm.com. It is important to note that membership to ICMM is endogenous to a variety of 
factors, and hence the results presented here should be taken with a grain of salt. In particular, it may be the case 
that companies deciding to join the ICMM are located in more stable areas which makes it less costly for them to 
join the ICMM. Indeed, in our data the conflict probability is twice lower in areas in which ICMM companies are 
present, even before the creation of ICMM in 2001. 
57 For the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), see https://eiti.org/eiti and http://www.pacweb.
org/en/regional-certification. For the Mineral Certification Scheme of the International Conference on the Great 
Lakes Region (GLR), see http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/49111368.pdf. 
58 The country is generally granted membership during the same year or in the year after submitting the report. 
We chose to use the date at which the report was submitted rather than the date at which membership was granted 
because of data limitations: our period of study ends in 2010, and only three countries were granted membership 
at this date (Ghana, Niger, and Liberia), two of which are very small. Considering the date at which the report was 
submitted allows to consider the effect on three (large) additional countries (Nigeria, Mauritania, and Mali). 
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member from the date when it requested adhesion. The triple interaction of interest 
has the expected sign but is not statistically significant. In columns 7–8, we take 
an alternative stand and code a given country as EITI member only when it has 
submitted the final validation report. With this more restrictive definition of mem-
bership, we detect a  conflict-dampening effect of EITI membership in column 7 
(which turns insignificant for battles in column 8). In sum, mining price spikes tend 
to have a less detrimental effect in EITI countries, provided that they have already 
started adhering to EITI rules. Note, however, that compliance to EITI standards 
occurred only in few countries in our sample period, hence these results need to be 
interpreted cautiously. A proper evaluation of the impact of these policies would 
imply using a dataset with an extended time period. Finally, column 9 shows that 
the conflict-inducing effect of mineral price rises is less severe in countries that 
have adhered to the GLR mineral certification scheme, while in column 10 no 
effect is detected for battle incidence.59
VI. Conclusion
This paper provides a systematic analysis of the impact of all major mineral 
extraction on the likelihood of armed conflict in Africa, using novel and fine-grained 
panel data with a spatial resolution of 0.5  × 0.5 degree latitude and longitude and 
covering the 1997–2010 period. We find a strongly significant and quantitatively 
large impact of mining activities on the likelihood of conflict incidence. We per-
form numerous sensitivity tests and show that the results are robust to a variety of 
alternative specifications. According to our estimates, the commodities super-cycle 
(i.e., the steep increase in mineral prices during the 2000s) accounts for 14 percent 
to 24 percent of the average violence observed in African countries over 1997–2010.
In terms of mechanisms, our baseline finding that mineral price shocks cause 
an increase in the risk of conflict is consistent with several potential channels. The 
presence of natural resources increases rebellion feasibility, boosts the potential 
for rent-seeking, favors weak state capacity and extractive institutions, exacerbates 
grievances, and drives down the opportunity cost of rebel recruitment by making 
production more capital-intensive. In contrast, we do not detect evidence of a migra-
tion channel, and our results contradict settings claiming that natural resources could 
reduce conflict by generating higher local incomes.
Our spatially fine-grained dataset allows us to carry out an in-depth analysis of 
a specific mechanism, namely the feasibility channel, through which mineral rents 
fuel fighting capacity and lead to the escalation of violence over space and time. 
In particular, we document that variations in the prices of minerals extracted in the 
ethnic homeland of a rebel group have a strong effect on conflicts involving this 
59 In Appendix Table 17 we carry out the analogous analysis, but focusing on the specification of column 4 of 
the baseline Table 2. We also find that control of corruption, Corporate Social Responsibility, and the Great Lakes 
Region certification scheme tend to decrease the conflict-boosting effect of mineral price shocks, although the 
results are somewhat weaker than in Table 7. Further, we replicate in Table A.37 in the online Appendix the regres-
sions of Table 7 but for domestic firms. Interestingly, we find that the detrimental effect of mining price spikes as 
well as the virtues of transparency are confined to foreign firms. Finally, Table A.38 in the online Appendix studies 
the effect of the Kimberley initiative on war diamonds. We find either no effect or a marginally significant con-
flict-reducing effect. These results are to be interpreted with caution given the limited source of identification and 
the drawbacks of the diamond price data mentioned previously. 
1601Berman et al.: How minerals Fuel ConFliCts in aFriCaVol. 107 no. 6
group elsewhere. Further, we show that gaining the territorial control of a mining 
area leads rebel groups to intensify and spread their fighting activity elsewhere in 
the territory in the successive periods, while winning a battle outside a mining area 
does not have such a conflict diffusion effect. While we see these empirical results 
as consistent with the feasibility channel, they should not be interpreted as ruling out 
that additional channels listed above could also be at work.
Our findings have important policy implications. It is likely that mineral extraction 
relaxes the financing constraints of rebels, because armed groups can sell minerals 
illicitly on the black market through the benefit of tacit or active support in various 
areas of society. Our empirical results suggest that one way for domestic govern-
ments to dampen rebellion feasibility effects would be to put in place more stringent 
anticorruption policies, and to support transparency/traceability initiatives in the 
mining industry. The multinational foreign firms have too their work to do, as we 
find that mines operated by companies complying with socially responsible prac-
tices are less at risk to fuel violence.
Appendix
A. Maps
Figure 3. Conflict Events and Mining Areas 
Sources: Geolocation of conflict from the Armed Conflict Location and Event dataset (ACLED 2014). Geolocation 
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B. Additional Results
Figure 4. Monte Carlo Sampling Distribution of ( ln price  × mines  > 0 )
Note: We draw randomly 1,000 times a main mineral for mining cells and we estimate specifications (2) and (4) of 
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Table 8—Robustness: Alternative Definitions of Mining Areas 
Estimator LPM
Dependent variable Conflict incidence
Def. mining area  V( M kt )  =  0 
Ever









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 0.072 0.043 0.033 0.050 0.056 0.056 0.050
(0.020) (0.014) (0.032) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Cell fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country  × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 142,296 143,768 133,492 143,375 143,768 143,768 143,768
Notes: LPM estimations. Conley (1999) standard errors in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within a 
500 km radius and for infinite serial correlation. In columns 1 to 5,  ln price main mineral is the world price of 
the mineral with the highest production over the period (evaluated at 1997 prices) for mining cells, and zero for 
 nonmining cells. Column 1: mines  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is active in the cell in year  t , 
and we consider only cells in which the mine dummy takes always the same value over the period. Column 2: mine 
takes the value 1 if the an active mine was observed in the cell at any point over the 1997–2010 period. Column 3: 
mine  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is active in the cell in year  t − 1 (coefficients on nonin-
teracted variables nonreported). Column 4: mine  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 from the first year an active 
mine is observed over the 1997–2010 period onward, 0 if no active mine was ever recorded, and is coded as missing 
otherwise. Column 5: mine  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 active mine was recorded in the cell in 
1997. Column 6: mine  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 active mine was recorded in the cell over the 
5-year presample period 1992–1996. Column 7: mine  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 active mine 
was ever recorded in the cell in the RMD data (period 1980–1996). 
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Table 9—Conflicts and Mineral Prices: 1  × 1 Degree Cells 
Estimator LPM
Dependent variable Conflict incidence
Sample All  V( M kt ) = 0 All  V( M kt ) = 0 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
mine  > 0 0.159 0.221
(0.068) (0.108)
 ln price main mineral −0.043 −0.049
(0.036) (0.021)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 0.130 0.104 0.118 0.154
(0.042) (0.036) (0.037) (0.041)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 (ever) 0.068
(0.022)
Country  × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No
Year fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Cell fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Neighbor-pairs fixed effects No No No No Yes
Observations 37,198 36,120 37,436 36,120 9,394
Notes: LPM estimations. Conley (1999) standard errors in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within a 
500 km radius and for infinite serial correlation. Variables: mines  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 
1 mine is active in the cell in year  t ; mines  > 0 (ever) is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is recorded 
in the cell at any point over the 1997–2010 period; mines  > 0 (neighboring cells) is a dummy taking the value 1 
if at least 1 mine is recorded in neighboring cells of degree 1 and 2 in year  t ;  V( M kt ) = 0 means that we consider 
only cells in which the mine dummy (or dummies in column 3) takes always the same value over the period. In all 
columns,  ln price main mineral is the world price of the mineral with the highest production over the period (evalu-
ated at 1997 prices) for mining cells, and zero for nonmining cells. Estimation (1) includes controls for the average 
level of mineral world price interacted with the mine dummy. 
Table 10—Main Mineral Price 
Estimator LPM
Dependent variable Conflict incidence
Robustness Single mineral Stable main mineral Price index
Sample  V( M kt )  =  0 None  V( M kt )  =  0 None  V( M kt )  =  0 None
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 0.046 0.068 0.065
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 (ever) 0.040 0.048 0.039
(0.016) (0.015) (0.013)
Country  × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Year fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
Cell fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Neighbor-pairs fixed effects No No No No No Yes
Observations 141,960 143,136 142,212 143,542 142,464 144,452
Notes: LPM estimations. Conley (1999) standard errors in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within a 
500 km radius and for infinite serial correlation. Variables: mine  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 
1 mine is active in the cell in year  t ; mines  > 0 (ever) is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is recorded in 
the cell at any point over the 1997–2010 period; mines  > 0 (neighboring cells) is a dummy taking the value 1 if at 
least 1 mine is recorded in neighboring cells of degree 1 and 2 in year  t ;  V( M kt ) = 0 means that we consider only 
cells in which the mine dummy takes always the same value over the period. In columns 1 and 2,  ln price mineral is 
the average price of the minerals produced in the cells, with weights equals to the share of each mineral in total pro-
duction value over the period. In columns 3 to 6,  ln price mineral is the world price of the mineral with the highest 
production over the period (evaluated at 1997 prices) for mining cells, and zero for nonmining cells. Columns 4 and 
5 include only mining cells producing a single mineral over the entire period. Columns 5 and 6 include only cells 
for which the main mineral is the same for each year of the sample. 
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Table 11—Number of Events 
Estimator LPM PPML LPM









2SD log(x + 1)
Inverse 
hyperbolic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample A.  V( M kt ) = 0 
 ln price  × mines  > 0 0.249 0.263 0.256 0.195 0.440 0.301 0.094 0.121
(0.240) (0.100) (0.155) (0.283) (0.197) (0.239) (0.032) (0.040)
Cell fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country  × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes No No
Observations 142,296 141,894 142,163 35,210 34,769 35,064 142,296 142,296
Sample B. All
 ln price  × mines  > 0 (ever) 0.245 0.216 0.217 0.253 0.395 0.289 0.070 0.089
(0.136) (0.079) (0.100) (0.264) (0.172) (0.194) (0.022) (0.028)
Cell fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country  × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes No No
Observations 143,864 143,361 143,634 35,980 35,472 35,771 143,864 143,864
Notes: LPM estimations. Conley (1999) standard errors in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within a 
500 km radius and for infinite serial correlation in columns 1 to 3 and 7 to 8. Standard errors clustered by country in 
columns 4 to 6. Variables: mines  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is active in the cell in year  t ; 
mines  > 0 (ever) is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is recorded in the cell at any point over the 1997–
2010 period;  V( M kt ) = 0 means that we consider only cells in which the mine dummy takes always the same value 
over the period;  ln price main mineral is the world price of the mineral with the highest production over the period 
(evaluated at 1997 prices) for mining cells, and zero for nonmining cells. 
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Table 12—Heterogeneous Effects: Cleavages 
Estimator LPM
Dependent variable Conflict incidence
Sample  V( M kt )  =  0 All  V( M kt )  =  0 All  V( M kt )  =  0 All  V( M kt )  =  0 All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 0.031 0.024 0.043 0.111
(0.026) (0.028) (0.032) (0.054)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 (ever) 0.027 0.015 0.014 0.095
(0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.038)
  × Gini 0.053 0.015
(0.043) (0.022)
  × ethnic frac. 0.015 0.002
(0.040) (0.025)
  × religious frac. 0.069 0.046
(0.038) (0.023)
  × ethnic pol. −0.017 0.015
(0.034) (0.022)
  × religious pol. 0.081 0.042
(0.034) (0.019)
  × indigenous −0.044 −0.060
(0.058) (0.041)
Country  × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 95,494 96,796 127,666 129,094 127,666 129,094 129,290 130,816
Notes: LPM estimations. Standard errors clustered by country in columns 1 to 6; Conley (1999) standard errors in 
parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within a 500 km radius and for infinite serial correlation in columns 7 
and 8. Variables: mines  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is active in the cell in year  t ; mines 
> 0 (ever) is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is recorded in the cell at any point over the 1997–2010 
period;  V( M kt ) = 0 means that we consider only cells in which the mine dummy takes always the same value over 
the period;  ln price main mineral is the world price of the mineral with the highest production over the period (eval-
uated at 1997 prices) for mining cells, and zero for nonmining cells. In columns 1 to 6, country-level variables are 
dummies taking the value 1 if the country is above the sample median of the corresponding variable before the start 
of the period. In columns 1 and 2, higher Gini scores correspond to larger inequality. In columns 7 and 8 the indig-
enous variable is a dummy taking a value of 1 if all groups in a given cell are indigenous. 
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Table 13—Heterogeneous Effects: Institutional Quality 
Estimator LPM
Dependent variable Conflict incidence
Sample  V( M kt )  =  0 All  V( M kt )  =  0 All  V( M kt )  =  0 All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 0.077 0.039 0.090
(0.051) (0.036) (0.036)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 (ever) 0.032 0.053 0.050
(0.029) (0.028) (0.024)
  × ICRG 0.002 0.020
(0.059) (0.033)
  × gov. effectiv. −0.053 0.024
(0.046) (0.034)
  × rule of law 0.027 0.030
(0.038) (0.047)
  × voice and accoun. 0.107 0.004
(0.048) (0.043)
  × control of corruption −0.043 −0.064
(0.040) (0.029)
  × polity IV −0.027 −0.008
(0.045) (0.027)
Country  × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115,626 117,082 131,628 133,126 131,712 133,210
Notes: LPM estimations. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Variables: mines  > 0 is a dummy 
taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is active in the cell in year  t ; mines  > 0 (ever) is a dummy taking the value 1 if 
at least 1 mine is recorded in the cell at any point over the 1997–2010 period;  V( M kt ) = 0 means that we consider 
only cells in which the mine dummy takes always the same value over the period;  ln price main mineral is the world 
price of the mineral with the highest production over the period (evaluated at 1997 prices) for mining cells, and 
zero for nonmining cells. Country-level variables are dummies taking the value 1 if the country is above the sample 
median of the corresponding variable before the start of the period. 
Table 14—Heterogeneous Effects: Minerals’ Capital Intensity 
Estimator LPM
Dependent variable Conflict incidence
Sample  V( M kt )  =  0 All  V( M kt )  =  0 All  V( M kt )  =  0 All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 0.119 0.089 0.069
(0.119) (0.026) (0.022)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 (ever) 0.087 0.078 0.041
(0.048) (0.023) (0.014)
  × open cast 0.078 −0.042
(0.650) (0.119)
  × energy intensity −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
  × mine age 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Country  × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 141,344 141,946 141,782 142,192 142,221 143,789
Notes: LPM estimations. Conley (1999) standard errors in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within a 
500 km radius and for infinite serial correlation. Variables: mines  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 
1 mine is active in the cell in year  t ; mines  > 0 (ever) is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is recorded in 
the cell at any point over the 1997–2010 period;  V( M kt ) = 0 means that we consider only cells in which the mine 
dummy takes always the same value over the period;  ln price main mineral is the world price of the mineral with the 
highest production over the period (evaluated at 1997 prices) for mining cells, and zero for nonmining cells; open 
cast is the average percentage of mines using open-pit mining method in Africa over the period; energy intensity is 
the ratio of ln(energy/production) over ln(employees/production); mine age is the number of years since the first 
mining activity was observed. 
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Table 15—Heterogeneous Effects: Minerals’ Lootability 
Estimator LPM
Dependent variable Conflict incidence
Sample  V( M kt )  =  0 All  V( M kt )  =  0 All  V( M kt )  =  0 All(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 : low price 0.046(0.027)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 : high price 0.065(0.025)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 (ever): low price 0.021(0.020)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 (ever): high price 0.044(0.017)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 0.117 0.088(0.050) (0.024)
 ln price  × mines  > 0 (ever) 0.027 0.054(0.048) (0.017)
  × high rents −0.061 0.010
(0.054) (0.050)
  × ore concentration −0.174 −0.166
(0.059) (0.056)
Country  × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 142,674 144,356 142,674 144,356 142,170 143,262
Notes: LPM estimations. Conley (1999) standard errors in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within a 
500 km radius and for infinite serial correlation. Variables: mines  > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 
mine is active in the cell in year  t ; mines  > 0 (ever) is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is recorded in 
the cell at any point over the 1997–2010 period;  V( M kt ) = 0 means that we consider only cells in which the mine 
dummy takes always the same value over the period;  ln price main mineral is the world price of the mineral with the 
highest production over the period (evaluated at 1997 prices) for mining cells, and zero for nonmining cells; high 
(respectively low) price means above (below) the sample median of prices in US$ per ton in 1997; high rents means 
that the ratio of mineral price over mineral-specific average costs for all African mines is above the sample median; 
ore concentration is the average concentration of the metal in the corresponding ore. 
Table 16—Mineral Price, Firm Ownership, and Conflicts (Robustness) 
Estimator LPM
Dependent variable Conflict incidence
Events All Battles All Battles All Battles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 ln price  × mines  > 0  × foreign firms 0.058 0.010
(0.021) (0.009)
 ln price  × mines  > 0  × dom. private firms 0.018 −0.001 0.018 −0.001 −0.011 −0.004
(0.014) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.024) (0.007)
 ln price  × mines  > 0  × dom. public firms 0.032 −0.005 0.031 −0.006 0.032 −0.005
(0.034) (0.019) (0.034) (0.019) (0.034) (0.019)
 ln price  × mines  > 0  × fgn firms (col.) 0.007 −0.012 −0.034 −0.016
(0.031) (0.017) (0.037) (0.018)
 ln price  × mines  > 0  × fgn firms (non col.) 0.071 0.015 0.043 0.013
(0.024) (0.010) (0.020) (0.009)
 ln price  × mines  > 0  × large firms 0.061 0.006
(0.033) (0.013)
Country  × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 143,542 143,542 143,542 143,542 143,542 143,542
Notes: LPM estimations. Conley (1999) standard errors in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within a 500 
km radius and for infinite serial correlation. Variables: mines  > 0 (ever) is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 
mine is recorded in the cell at any point over the 1997–2010 period;  V( M kt ) = 0 means that we consider only cells 
in which the mine dummy takes always the same value over the period;  ln price main mineral is the world price 
of the mineral with the highest production over the period (evaluated at 1997 prices) for mining cells, and zero for 
nonmining cells. The company characteristics (foreign, domestic public, domestic private, etc.) denote the share of 
mines owned by a given category at the beginning of the period. Cells containing only mines with missing owner-
ship information are dropped. 
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